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The "Squeaky Wheel"
Employee: To Grease or to

Replace and the Costs of Each*
By Charles A. Edwards**
and Lovic A. Brooks, III***

[T]he Board seems unable to recognize that as a matter of business
judgment there can be only one course open to management when an
employee persists in giving it the finger.'
Judge Aldrich's comments are, it seems, all too often ignored by the
agencies entrusted with the enforcement of federal statutes affecting free
speech in the workplace-the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Wage-Hour Division, United States Department of Labor. This article will examine the
validity of the premise discussed by Judge Aldrich in view of the statutory framework, and will suggest the alternatives to the "only one
course"-discharge-involved in the Aldrich thesis itself.
The necessity for such an analysis, and for a reevaluation of the manner in which regulatory bureaucracies approach claims of employer retaliation, is illustrated in Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB.2 The charging party,
* This article is an expansion of a discussion in Edwards, "Protection of the Complaining
Employee: How Much Is Too Much?," pending publication in the Employee Relations Law
Journal.
** Partner, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson College (A.B., 1967);
University of North Carolina School of Law (J.D., 1970). Member of the State Bar of
Georgia.
*** Associate, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Columbia, South Carolina. University of
South Carolina (B.A., 1974, J.D., 1977). Member of the State Bar of Georgia and the South

Carolina Bar.
1. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 606 (1st Cir. 1979) (Aldrich, J.,
concurring).
2. 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979), denying enforcement of 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 99 L.R.R.M.
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John Sanford, was hired by Power Systems as one of four journeyman
millwrights. Sanford's union, Carpenters' Local 1092, designated him as
jobsite steward. Less than two weeks thereafter, Sanford was discharged.
Sanford then filed an unfair labor practice charge against Power Systems
with the NLRB, contending that his termination had been occasioned by
"his Union activity regarding safety radiation dosage, contract, improper
tools. '" The Board investigated and advised Sanford that no further action was warranted, since Sanford had refused to process employee grievances through formal channels, engaged in "numerous encounters and
confrontations with [his] fellow employees, representatives of . . . [his]
own union, as well as employees and supervisors working for other employers on the site," and had stopped work "for lengthy periods in order
'4
to complain about tools."
Sanford appealed the dismissal and lodged charges against his union
and the Board. The NLRB General Counsel ordered the local Board office to investigate further and to obtain sworn affidavits from Power Systems. After these affidavits were supplied, the General Counsel dismissed
the appeal. More than two years after his discharge, Sanford filed a complaint with OSHA in which he contended that his discharge had been
motivated by a desire to retaliate against him for safety complaints.
OSHA investigated and dismissed the charge.
Having been subjected to two administrative investigations, with their
attendent time, trouble and expense, Power Systems undertook its own
investigation, filing Freedom of Information Act requests concerning Sanford's activities. The company uncovered a total of forty-three separate
unfair labor practice charges which Sanford had filed, and was advised
that the Peoria, Illinois, office of the Board, with approval from the General Counsel, "had established a special procedure for dealing with Sanford's complaints.'
Power Systems then asked the Board if it would be in violation of Sanford's rights under the Labor-Management Relations Act if it filed a civil
suit against Sanford. No definitive answer was received, but the company
was advised to study the Board's decisions in Clyde Taylor Co.' and
Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers.7 Since Taylor
states that the Act is not necessarily violated by the institution of civil
suits against those entitled to the statute's protections, Power Systems
sued Sanford for damages sustained through the filing of charges with the

1652
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

(1978).
Id. at 937.
Id. (Letter from Board to Sanford, Jan. 7, 1975).
Id.
127 N.L.R.B. 103, 45 L.R.R.M. 1514 (1960).
148 N.L.R.B. 679, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964).
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Board and OSHA "without probable cause and for the purpose of
harassment."8
The Board then filed a complaint, charging Power Systems with suing
Sanford "to further an unlawful objective." The case was submitted directly to the NLRB for decision, whereupon the Board found that the
company "had no reasonable basis for the filing of its lawsuit, . . the
lawsuit had as its purpose the unlawful objective of penalizing Sanford
for filing a charge with the Board

.

"10

After reviewing these facts,

the Seventh Circuit's conclusion was succinct:
Our holding in this case is narrow: the Board's finding that the company filed its civil complaint without a reasonable basis and for an improper purpose is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as
a whole. We intimate no view on the scope of the Board's power to determine, in circumstances other than those presented here, that the filing of
a civil action based upon the defendant's charge filed with the Board is
an unfair labor practice. We recognize that civil actions for malicious
prosecution carry with them a potential for chilling employee complaints
to the Board and that the Board may, in a proper case, act to curb such
conduct. This is not such a case.1"
Consider the employer's plight. At the instigation of one disgruntled
former employee with a proven history of filing meritless complaints and
charges, Power Systems had been through three NLRB investigations,
one OSHA investigation, one formal NLRB proceeding and a petition for
review in a United States Court of Appeals. It had "won," and yet the
operational problems, court costs and attorneys' fees accrued were no
doubt staggering. The most amazing aspect of the battle between Sanford
and Power Systems is that, even with a special Board procedure applicable only to Sanford and Sanford's track record (twenty-five charges withdrawn, fourteen dismissed, three settled and one resulting in a Board order), the Board nonetheless found the company's claim of malicious
prosecution to be groundless. Yet that is the nature of the problem faced
in the American workplace today, a problem which is examined in the
ensuing discussion.
In a climate of political and social consciousness which has come to
accept the "whistle blowers," those hardy (or foolhardy) souls who point
out their employers' deficiencies to investigators and to the news media,
new attention is being focused upon the legal ramifications of the employers' efforts to deal with dissension in the ranks. There are two general
8. 601 F.2d at 938.

9. Id.
10.
11.

239 N.L.R.B. at 450.
601 F.2d at 940.
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approaches to the problem: either the cause of the dissension is discovered and solved, or the employer seeks to rid himself of the source of the
disturbance. The latter choice, to retaliate against the employee, may lead
to problems under one or several anti-reprisal provisions in federal law.
It is not the purpose of this article to endorse either a viewpoint or a
solution, although candor dictates that the authors point out their bias
toward the interest of the employer. The ensuing discussion contrasts and
compares various statutes and demonstrates apparent inconsistencies in
approach which find their source in sympathy rather than logic. The discussion concludes with a plea for common-sense and for a uniform application of the law's protections of the "whistle blower" that does not sacrifice his employer's right to discipline those responsible for harassment or
bad-faith accusations.
I.

PROLOGUE: NovoTw's UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

On June 11, 1979, the Supreme Court issued a 6-3 decision in the case
of Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny.is
The facts generated three potential issues: First, can section 1985(c) 1 3 be

invoked to redress violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended?14 Second, does Title VII protect relational injuries, such as
advocacy of the rights of others to be free from discrimination in employment? Finally, can agents of a corporation conspire with each other or
with the corporation itself so as to violate the provisions of section
1985? z5 Of these three questions, the Court answered only the first. The
third was disposed of by reserving it for future decision.1 6 The second
question, one of "standing," was not within the Court's definition of the
issues on which review had been granted.
The majority opinion is extremely short and the substance of the decision can be found in four sentences:
Section 1985(c) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a
remedy for violation of the rights it designates. The primary question in
the present case, therefore, is whether a person injured by a conspiracy
to violate § 704(a) of Title VII ... is deprived of "the equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws" within
12. 442 U.S. 366 (1979). Mr. Justice Stewart spoke for the majority, while Mr. Justice
White wrote a dissenting opinion for himself and Justices Brennan and Marshall.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976).
16. 442 U.S. at 372, n.11. "For the purposes of this question, we assume but certainly do
not decide that the directors of a single corporation can form a conspiracy within the meaning of § 1985(c)."

1981]

"SQUEAKY WHEEL" EMPLOYEE

483

the meaning of § 1985(c) ....
The only question here, therefore, is
whether the rights created by Title VII may be asserted within the remedial framework of § 1985(c) . . . [Dleprivation of a right created by
17
Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under § 1985(c).

This language provides the answer to Novotny's first question. Yet it is
Novotny's second and unanswered question that triggers the ensuing
discussion.
The facts underlying this second issue should be considered briefly.
Novotny, an officer and director of Great American, claimed that his open
support for the rights of female employees of the Association resulted in
his being discharged. He sued, after exhaustion of Title VII's administrative remedies, claiming that his discharge had violated section 704(a) of
Title VII. This section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.1 '

The trial court found that this claim could not be brought by Novotny
under the facts presented.' The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that a
valid claim under section 704(a) had been established.20 As mentioned,
the Supreme Court never reached this issue.
Yet, issues of this type form the nucleus for the analysis presented in
this article. The authors contend that a sporadic, yet consistent, expansion of the law's proscriptions against allegedly retaliatory conduct
against employees and others entangled in the employment relationship
has led, much in the manner of a large object dropped into a small pool,
to a concentric series of waves which are now reaching and rebounding
from the shores to produce unintended and undesirable results in the
form of a proliferation of litigation.
11.

CONSTTUTMONAL ISSUES

The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Mt. Healthy City Board of Edu17. 442 U.S. at 372, 377, 378.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
19. 430 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
20. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978). Compare EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477
(5th Cir. 1980) with Daley v. St. Agnes Hosp., Inc. 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 16,726 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
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cation v. Doyle,' concluded that the exercise of a public employee's constitutional rights serves as no insulation from discharge by his employer
for a good cause. This is true when an employee claims that he is being
discharged for an illegal reason, but the employer can show that the discharge would have taken place anyway for a legal reason. Until recently,
this precept had only been applied by the federal appellate courts to
NLRB decisions."2 However, in August of 1980, the Board in Wright
Line"2 abandoned the "in part" test of causation and adopted the "but
for" test of Mt. Healthy."
Still, the issue raised is both valid and vexing. Where may the line be
drawn between freedom of speech and the right to petition for redress of
grievances, both guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, and an employer's legitimate concern in conducting its business without undue interference by
the hypersensitive or the malicious? In this context, it may be (but probably is not) important to distinquish between the informal grievance and
the formal charge or between the governmental complainant and his private counterpart. In any case, the answer must be found in a study of
catchy, but not altogether helpful, statements from Supreme Court decisions, such as: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.' 1 5
While these precedents are for the most part confined to the public
employment arena, the boundaries between the private and the public
(and, therefore, constitutionally regulated) sectors are less distinct and
disappear entirely in the law evolving in state courts. For example, in
King v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,26 it was
found that termination of an employee for refusal to shave off his beard
did not disqualify the man from collecting unemployment insurance. The
state failed to show how it would be "adversely affected if benefits were
granted"17 and, even if such a showing had been made, that "no conceivable alternatives would preclude the adverse results without infringing
First Amendment rights."' When such statements are coupled with the
tendency of arbitrators and courts to import constitutional theories of

21. 429 U.S. 274 (1976).
22. See N.L.R.B. v. South Shore Hosp., 571 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1978); Coletti's Furniture,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977).
23. 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (August 27, 1980).
24. 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
25. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525 (1958) ("[T]he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which
may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn.").
26. 25 Cal. App. 3d 199, 101 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1972).
27. Id. at 206, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
28. Id.
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"due process of law" into the private employment picture,29 the day of
full applicability of those protections to the private employee may be only
minutes over the horizon.
III. TrrLE VII
As previously noted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in its
current form" bans retaliation against those who avail themselves of statutory remedies. Of late, the number of litigated cases involving retaliatory
discrimination under Title VII has steadily increased despite the EEOC's
inclusion of the language of section 704(a) s l in its "notice of charge"
form,8 ' which now must be provided to the respondent within ten days of
the filing of a charge of discriminati6n.5
Section 704(a) contains two separate bases for protection. The first is
the "relational" or "representative" status of an individual who has "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,"" previously adverted to in the discussion of the Novotny decision."5 This is a broadly-worded charter of free speech in the workplace,
at least insofar as it concerns the areas of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, religion and national origin. As such, the first of the statute's protections is analogous to the "protected concerted activity" discussed below." The second area of protection focuses upon the presentation of the statutory avenues of redress-an area more like section 8(a)(4)
of the National Labor Relations Act.'7
One of the first cases brought under the second clause of Title VII's
reprisal section was Stebbins v. Insurance Company of North America."
Stebbins, an indefatigable pro se litigant,"9 had applied for the position of
29. See, e.g., Gilman Paper Co. v. Machinists, Local 1128, 61 Lab. Arb. 416 (Murphy,
Arb.) ("industrial due process" violated by employer's failure to interrogate grievant before
reaching a decision to terminate his employment). See also Hogler, Industrial Due Process
and Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 31 LAB. L.J. 570 (1980).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
32. A "Notice of Non-Retaliation Requirement" (see EMPL. PRAc. GumE (CCH) (2171) is
included with the EEOC's "Notice of Charge of Employment Discrimination" (EEOC Form
131).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). and see, 29 C.F.R. § 1610.13 (May 6, 1972), as modified, 51 Fed. Reg. 34745 (Aug. 16, 1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e:3(a) (1976).
35. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). See infra notes 246-289 and accompanying text.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4). See infra, notes 169-245 and accompanying text.
38. 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6525 (D.D.C.), modified 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6633 (D.D.C. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39. See Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
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claims adjuster with INA. The company's attorneys, obviously concerned
over Stebbins' insistence upon besieging the company with correspon-

dence and attempted visits while litigation was pending, addressed a letter to him stating:
As counsel for INA, we object to any attempt by you to deal with INA
except through their counsel while the current litigation between you
and INA is pending. If you have any business to conduct with INA, I
request that you do so only through this law firm as INA's counsel.4 0
Stebbins argued that this letter was violative of section 704(a). This con-

tention was rejected, and the complaint was dismissed as frivolous. Although the trial court's 4order was reversed on other grounds,' 1 the reprisal ruling was affirmed. '
While Mr. Stebbins sought his claims adjuster position, a Negro former

employee of AT&T sued AT&T claiming that she had been subjected to
unlawful racial discrimination. She claimed that her discharge had been
motivated by both a mixture of racial animus and the filing of discrimina424 U.S. 946 (1976); Stebbins v. Allstate Ins. Cos., No. 22,971 (D.C. Cir., May 19, 1970)
(affirming grant of summaiy judgment to defendants); Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969); Stebbins v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968); Stebbins v.
Continental Ins. Cos., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6471 (D.D.C. 1976); Stebbins v. EEOC, 4 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 6453 (D.D.C. 1972); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec.
5302 (E.D. Va. 1971), ajf'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
939 (1973); Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1093 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd, 481
F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Stebbins v. Continental Ins. Cos., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6410 (D.D.C.
1969), affd per curiam, 442 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., No.
466-67 (D.D.C., Mar. 28, 1968), appeal denied as frivolous, No. 3253 (D.C. Cir., May 9,
1968); Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2417-66 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 1968) (dismissal ordered), appeal denied, No. 3292 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1107 (1969); Stebbins v. George Washington Univ., No. 5044 (D.C. App., Mar. 20, 1970)
-(affirming dismissal), leave to appeal denied, No. 24,069 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 23, 1970); Stebbins
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield & Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, Nos. 4873, 4909 (D.C. App.,
Dec. 31, 1969), leave to appeal denied, No. 23,937 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 23, 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 844 (1970). This list, while lengthy, is incomplete. A recent decision, this time
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, is Stebbins v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5987 (D.D.C. 1979).
40. Quoted in Complaint, para. V(a), Civil No. 2036-70, (D.D.C.); see 3 Empl. Prc. Dec.
at 6635 n.4.
41. Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1973).
42. Id. at 511. Stebbins later alleged retaliation in a suit against Nationwide, and this
time prevailed. The court citing Pettway, infra, found that a letter from Nationwide to
Stebbins stating that his earlier suit was "an unfounded charge of racial discrimination"
which had destroyed the "mutual confidence which we consider essential to the employeremployee relationship" constituted retaliation; the court awarded Stebbins $1.00. Stebbins
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5302, 5303 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd per
curiam, 469 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 939 (1973).
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tion charges with the EEOC.4" Although the court found no racial discrimination in light of the plaintiff's "less than exemplary work record,"
the retaliation claim was supported by the fact that after plaintiff filed
her EEOC charge, "a procedure applicable only to her and directed solely
to her EEOC complaint was inaugurated. 4 Reviewing this "procedure,"
which included surveillance of the plaintiff's activities and heavy documentation of her shortcomings, the court concluded that she had been
singled out for retaliation resulting in her dismissal. Thus, even though
the court had held that she was a less than satisfactory worker, the court
ordered that she be reinstated with an award of back pay, attorneys' fees
and costs.
That same year, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a trial court's ruling that
employers could not hide behind assertions of "business necessity" in refusing to hire applicants who had filed charges against other employers.4"
On the other hand, an employer's argument, in another case, that a discharged charging party had an "uncooperative attitude" was accepted as
justification for her demotion and later termination over her assertions
that the company's underlying motive was desire for revenge."* Yet in
EEOC v. Midas, Inc.,4 retaliatory discharges were aggravated by discriminatory reference letters when it was found that the employer had notified the two discharged charging parties "that copies of the letter of notification of the charge would go to all motels and hotels in the area and
[charging parties] therefore would not be able to find work. 4"
Most reported Title VII retaliation decisions involve either those who
have fied charges and suits or those who have engaged in protests. There
43. Francis v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1972).
44. Id. at 207.
45. Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1217 (D.N.M. 1970), a/I'd, 462 F.2d 149
(10th Cir. 1972). United Nuclear allegedly informed plaintiff "that notwithstanding his
qualifications for the vacancy his application could not be processed until there was no
longer a dispute between him and" another company. Id. at 152.
46. Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 52 F.R.D. 383 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 479 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 7 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 6873 (N.D. Ala. 1973), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1975); Fogg v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 346 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.H. 1972); Goodloe v. Martin Marietta Corp., 7 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 6992 (D. Colo. 1972), aff'd mem., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5245 (10th Cir. 1974).
Compare Sperling v. United States, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7255 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
47. EEOC v. Midas, Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5730 (D.N.M. 1974).
48. Id. at 5731. For other "retaliatory references" cases, see Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge
Co., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978), and Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 11 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 7484 (D.N.M. 1976), a/I'd, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977); Cf. Daley v. Saint
Agnes Hosp., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (allegations of "blacklist conspiracy"
dismissed) and Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 16 Empl.Prac. Dec. 5355 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 622 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (union found liable for retaliatory job referrals).
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is little case law on the statutory right "to testify, assist or participate" in
EEOC proceedings.4 The statute makes no distinction between "lawful"
and "unlawful" protests, or between "reasonable" and "unreasonable"
charges. Nonetheless, the evolution of Title VII case law has been marked
by some judicially created, common sense exceptions to the inflexible
mandate of the statutory language.
A case in point is Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.50 Green claimed
that McDonnell Douglas had rejected his employment application "because of [his] race and because of [his] persistent involvement in the Civil
Rights Movement."5 1 The EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the rejection had been due to Green's civil rights
activities, but made no determination as to the alleged racial bias.' 2 The
court of appeals agreed with the district court that the civil rights protests involved ("stall-in" and "lock-in" demonstrations at McDonnell's
plant entrances in violation of a contractual no-strike clause) were not
within the purveiw of section 704(a).'"
. Plaintiff Green relied on the section 704(a) protection of "opposing any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter," arguing that he had engaged in a non-violent protest against discriminatory
practices." The company countered with the argument that the protest
was illegal. The court of appeals agreed: "Those who have the courage to
challenge discriminatory practices of an employer merit. . . protection.
Without doubt, lawful protest merits the same protection, but we find no
suggestion that protection extends to activities which run afoul of the
law.""P
The court of appeals refused to accept as analogous the Fifth Circuit's
ruling in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co." that section 704(a)
prohibits an employer from discharging an employee who makes false
statements in an EEOC charge. In Pettway, the scope of section 704(a)
was deemed to be broader than the protections conferred by section
8(a)(4) of the Labor Management Relations Act or by section 15(a)(3) of

49. Hunter v. Stetson, 444 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (union officer who assisted in
pursuit of case); EEOC v. Locals 14 & 15, International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 438 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (witnesses). See also, Smith v. Columbus Metropolitan Hous.
Auth., 443 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (refusal to coopearate with employer by signing
affidavit).
50. 318 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Mo. 1970), rev'd, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972) (as modified on
petition for rehearing), vacated, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
51. 463 F.2d at 339 (EEOC Charge, filed September 14, 1965).

52. See 463 F.2d at 339.
53. Id. at 341.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
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the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 although the exact relationship of these
various protections was not defined. So, in Pettway, Chief Judge Brown
concluded: "[tihe Act will be frustrated if the employer may unilaterally
determine the truth or falsity of charges and take independent action.""
However, it was stated that the employer might nonetheless have an actionable claim against the charging party for malicious defamation5
NLRA and FLSA cases which had found that "only false and inaccurate,
and not malicious statements are protected" 0 were distinguished, since
Pettway "arose in an entirely different proceeding under an Act with an
entirely different purpose and before an agency with an entirely different
function and severely limited power." 61
The Supreme Court took certiorari in Green, but did not concern itself
with section 704(a) except as it related to Green's collateral claim of racial bias. 2 The case was remanded for decision as to that claim. When
the trial court dealt with the case on remand, the same result was reached
by concluding that the company had rebutted Green's claim of racial bias
by a showing that his rejection had been based solely on his illegal
conduct.""
Further illustration indicates the problems that courts have had in deciding what section 704(a) protects. The difficulty in articulating the balancing test utilized by most courts in determining whether an individual
is protected by section 704(a) is evidenced in the First Circuit's decision
in Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.:"
Neither in its wording nor legislative history does section 704(a) make
plain how far Congress meant to immunize hostile and disruptive employee activity ...[but] [ciertain broad premises can be accepted with
confidence. Congress certainly did not mean to grant sanctuary to employees to engage in political activity for women's liberation on company
time, and an employee does not enjoy immunity from discharge for misconduct merely by claiming that at all times she was defending the rights
of her sex by "opposing" discriminatory practices .... The standard [to

be applied in balancing employer and employee interests] can be little
57. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976); see discussion accompanying notes 98-111, infra.
58. 411 F.2d at 1005; see also id. at 1006 nn.18-20.
59. Id. at 1007 n.22, citing, Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) and SaLzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963). See text accompanying notes 322-333 infra.
60. 411 F.2d at 1006 n.19; See, e.g., Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 333 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1964); Walls Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1962).
61. 411 F.2d at 1006, n.19.
62. 411 U.S. 792, 797 n.6 (1973). That issue was not presented to the Court for review.
63. 390 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Mo. 1975), afl'd, 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976).
64. 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).
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more definitive than the rule of reason applied by a judge or other tribunal to given facts.68

In that case, the court upheld the discharge of a female scientist" who

constantly complained about alleged discrimination, circulated rumors
that the institution was in jeopardy of losing its federal grant money,

challenged the assistant director of the institution to take sides in plaintiff's ongoing dispute with the director, and disclosed her files containing
confidential salary information to a newspaper reporter. In short, the fact
that this conduct was associated with her complaints of sex discrimina-

tion did not shelter her from the natural consequences of insubordina7
tion, since, in the words of the court of appeals, she "went too far."
Other actions found sufficient to justify the discharge of a discrimina-

tion complainant include circumventing the "chain of command" by leaving one's work station to present grievances directly to top management,"

refusing to comply with grooming standards about which a charge had
been filed with the EEOC," refusing to comply with suspension instructions and sending the employer's representative an insulting letter, 70 and
engaging in "obdurate" conduct in advocating greater employment of

blacks.71 While one court has said that "[T]itle VII's ban on retaliation

does not encompass a vague allegation of 'protest' against an employer's
alleged discriminatory practices... [and] was enacted to prohibit retali-

ation against employees who seek to air their claims with the EEOC,"7 '
this appears to be an overstatement. Protests against discriminatory con-

duct are protected by section 704(a), but the statute does not license an
employee who has filed a charge "to act imprudently thereafter as an
employee.""

There are two apparent threshold requirements before a section 704(a)
65. Id. at 230-231.
66. Hochstadt v. Worchester Foundation, 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), affd, 545
F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).
67. 545 F.2d at 231, 234.
68. Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976).
69. Druia v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6508 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
70. Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 397 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 722
(2d Cir. 1976). The suspension was imposed during an investigation of complaints about the
plaintiff by her fellow employees. The Second Circuit sustained an award of attorneys' fees
against the plaintiff, concluding that her litigation was "motivated by malice and vindictiveness and that it was without merit." 535 F.2d at 728. See also Johnson v. University of
Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
71. High v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 131 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), alfd, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
72. EEOC v. Beaver Gasoline Co., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5033 (W.D. Pa. 1977), vacated,
584 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1978).
73. EEOC v. Del Rio Nat'l Bank, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4928, 4929 (W.D. Tex. 1975).
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violation can be found. First, a viable claim under section 704(a) requires
that plaintiff make a showing of scienter on the part of the employer. In a
case in which there was no proof that any member of the company's management was aware that plaintiff was circulating a draft petition alleging
racial discrimination before the plaintiff was discharged, no retaliatory
motive could be inferred.7 ' Constructive actions by the employer, such as
transferring a complaining employee to another department to eliminate
the possibility that the claimed discrimination would prejudice the plaintiff's chances for advancement, are also not subject to attack so long as
they are not subterfuges for retaliation.75 For example, the District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio decided that a three-day suspension of a
General Motors employee was the retaliatory result of his refusal to withdraw a grievance alleging racial discrimination, and awarded $1,000.00 in
damages." Second, a viable claim apparently requires that the employer
was subject to the mandates of Title VII at the time of the charge. In
contrast to section 8(a)(4) cases, which have found violations of the
NLRA despite a lack of jurisdiction over the employer,7 7 the one court
which has faced the issue in the Title VII setting has found that retalia74. Wilson v. Willowbrook, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Tex. 1977), afl'd, 569 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 845 (1978); Downey v. A. H. Belo Corp., 402 F. Supp. 1368
(N.D. Tex. 1975).
75. Compare, Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 416 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Mo. 1976),
afl'd, 552 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1977) (no discrimination) with McMullen v. Warner, 416 F.
Supp. 1163 (D.D.C. 1976) (unlawful to inform complainant that there were no funds available to reimburse him for tuition paid for work-related classes) and Kornbluh v. Stearns &
Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (discharge of plaintiff for falsified application,
discovered in investigation of wife's employment application, raised possibility of pretext
sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment based on findings by arbitrator and
state agency). See generally Aguirre v. Chula Vista Sanitary Serv. & Sani-Tainer, Inc., 542
F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff must have opportunity to demonstrate that defendant's
asserted reasons were pretextual); B. Schei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination
Law 125 (student ed. Supp. 1979), reviewing the burden of proof in Title VII retaliation
cases as explained by the court in Sutton v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 445 F. Supp.
1319, 1327-23 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
76. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 383 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 532 F.2d
517 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976). See also Hyland v. Kenner Prods. Co.,
9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7515 (S.D. Ohio 1974). This case, decided in the same year as Senter
trial, involved an injunction against the discharge of a charging party pending EEOC conciliation efforts, although "irreparable damage" had not been shown. In a subsequent trial,
plaintiff proved her allegations of reprisal and was awarded back pay, "front pay" and attorney fees, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7902 (S.D. Ohio 1976). (The "front pay," for six months, was
granted to enable plaintiff to seek other employment, reinstatement having been denied.)
But in EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 535 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976), a similar preliminary injunction against discharge of the charging party (10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5188) (N.D.
Cal. 1975) was reversed by a divided court. But see Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d
69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974).
77. See note 240 infra and accompanying text.
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tion for the filing of charges against an employer, not covered by Title VII
at the time of the charge, cannot be litigated under section 704(a).78
Yet for the most part, threshold requirements have not really hindered
findings of violations. One need only look at a few illustrations. An interesting case involving alleged retaliatory conduct is United States v. City

of Milwaukee.79 The Attorney General sought and obtained a preliminary
injunction against the use of a Milwaukee Police Department rule, which

"prohibited department members from discussing matters concerning the
department with outsiders," to prevent minority members of the force
from cooperating with a federal investigation of employment practices in

the department." Further, in EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc.,s 1 an
accounting firm was found to have engaged in illegal reprisals against an
EEOC claimant who had also advised her fellow employees of her own
case and of their right to file similar charges. The firm's attempted defense that the charging party's conduct had interfered with the firm's relationship with a client by eliciting support from the client was rejected

as insufficiently substantiated.82 The court cited decisions under the National Labor Relations Act 8 3 for the proposition that "[e]ven if defendant
was in part motivated by this incident, the court's finding that its deci-

sion was also motivated by unlawful factors makes the suspension
illegal."
In East v. Romine, Inc., Judge Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit, relying
only on section 704(a) itself and that court's prior decision in Pettway,

determined that a trial court's finding of nondiscrimination 8 had improperly failed to consider evidence of retaliatory conduct:
78. Winsey v. Pace College, 394 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see Held v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 373 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1974), and Baker v. Columbus Mun. Separate School
Dist., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7755 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
79. 390 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Wis. 1975), affd, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976).
80. Id. at 1126.
81. 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), supp., 420 F. Supp. 919 (1976), afl'd, 559 F.2d 1203
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
82. 401 F. Supp. at 71-72.
83. Id. at 71 n.17 citing NLRB v. George J. Roberts & Sons, Inc., 451 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1971), NLRB v. Gladding Keystone Corp., 435 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1970), NLRB v. Milco, Inc.,
388 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1968), NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 341 F.2d 725 (2d Cir.
1965), NLRB v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963), and NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp., 211 F.2d 725 (2d Cir.
1954). None of these five decisions involved section 8(a)(4), and several (e.g., Park Edge
Sheridan Meats) found that inferences of discrimination did not predominate over proof of
justification for discharge.
84. 401 F. Supp. at 72 n.17. Compare, Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979) ("but for" test means that plaintiff must show he would have been retained if the
employer had not practiced discrimination against him).
85. 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7596 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
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The second consideration [in support of the employer's decision not to
hire the plaintiff] noted by the district court was that Ms. East had filed
two previous EEOC complaints and that her complaints raised the likelihood that she was a litigious person [but] . . . [a] person cannot be pe-

nalized for resorting to the legal procedures that Congress has established in order to right congressionally recognized wrongs."
The court in Romine, recognizing that the plaintiff in Pettway, who included malicious statements in his EEOC charge, was not an attractive
candidate for judicial protection found that Ms. East had "not been
shown to be as disagreeable as the plaintiff whom we protected in Pettway. There was no claim, let alone a finding, that any of East's charges
were false. ' '8 7 To make it clear that this statement did not indicate second
thoughts about Pettway, however, the court added:
The statute prevents a bill of attainder against one for asserting one's
rights. Title VII would be chilled to a freeze by allowing the icy finger of
job discharge or refusal to touch an individual who claims his Title VII
rights. The resort to legal rights cannot itself legalize discrimination."
Finally, in Brown v. Colman-Cocker Co.,89 a textile machinery repairing
firm was ordered to give back pay to a welder who had been discharged in
reprisal for the filing of EEOC charges. In this instance, the employer
reinstated the plaintiff, pursuant to an arbitrator's award, but to a lowerrated position than that which he had previously held. The court reasoned that:
[W]ith the falling market, systematic lay-off and cut-backs, elimination of
the previous buildup of inventory, anticipated cutback in job opportunities in fabrication and the inability of welders to bump junior employees
. . . the Company knew or should have known that the plaintiff would be
discharged or laid-off within a short period of time,"
in spite of the fact that at the time of trial, the company was no longer in
business. Additionally, the back pay award was "not to be diminished by
the fact that the company offered the plaintiff lower paying jobs in lower
job classifications than welder."" Thus, the trend in section 704(a) cases
86. East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. 518 F.2d at 341.
88. Id. at 342.
89. 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6087 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
9o. Id. at 6092.
91. Id., citing Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 220-223 (4th Cir. 1967) (the
victim may "refuse to accept other employment which is dangerous, distasteful or essentially different from that in which he is employed"). The same plaintiff had previously been
awarded back pay from another employer; see Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co.,
457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
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has produced a preponderence of judgments in favor of plaintiffs. 9
A few recent decisions demonstrate that the mid-1970's receptiveness
to retaliation claims is, however, giving way to a more restrictive attitude
on the part of the judiciary. An example is Hernandez v. Alexander.es
The plaintiff was a civilian employee of the government, with a GS-13
salary rating at the Army's White Sands Missile Range, who claimed that
he was discriminatorily denied a promotion to a position with a GS-14
rating because of his national origin (Mexican-American) and that he was
subsequently transferred in retaliation for his administrative complaints
of discrimination. After the plaintiff was denied the promotion, which the
court found to be nondiscriminatory, he began to file numerous internal

EEO complaints. It reached the point that plaintiff was spending about
thirty-five percent of his working hours preparing and filing EEO com-

plaints. His superiors found his actions to be disruptive and the personal
conflicts existing between plaintiff and other personnel posed a serious
threat to the safety of missile tests at the facility. Plaintiff's particular
division was responsible for range safety. Accordingly, the plaintiff was

transferred to another division. In sustaining the trial court's determination that there was no retaliation, the Tenth Circuit discussed the plaintiff's "wholesale" filing of EEO complaints and stated:
These factors took the matter out of the usual retaliatory standards. For
all practical purposes they were no longer EEO complaints, but an occupation of plaintiff in itself and within his principal job. It is apparent
that such an activity, pursued to the extent that it was, and under the
circumstances, must be regarded as something quite different from the
typical filing of EEO complaints and so different that they are removed
(considering them as a whole as did the trial court) from the application
of the usual standards. These complaints became very nearly the principal activity of the plaintiff and were a part of his continuing resistance to
the reorganization."
92. In addition to the decisions discussed in text, these cases include: Winston v. LearSiegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1977) (allegation of white male's discharge for protesting firing of a black co-worker states a cause of action, motion for summary judgment de-

nied); EEOC v. Union Bank, 11 Empl.Prac. Dec. 7199 (D. Ariz. 1976) (harassment, demotion and suspension of charging party and of another female employee who "openly
associated with" her); United States v. City of Socorro, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6917 (D.N.M.
1976) (husband of charging party constructively discharged by threats of fellow workers);
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (white female who associated with black males); Contra,Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d
138, 142 (9th Cir. 1978); Pittman v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 408 F. Supp. 286 (E.D.N.C.
1974, as amended, 1976) (class action allowed to challenge "retaliatory pattern"); But see
Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6583 (N.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd, 547 F.2d 466 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
93. 607 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1979).
94. Id. at 924.
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Another decision in a similar vein in Rosser v. Laborers, Local 438,95 in
which the Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding that a defendant union did not
retaliate against an employee when it discharged her due to a conflict
with her superior. Edith Rosser was a dues posting clerk employed by the
Laborers' union. Her immediate superior was the union Secretary-Treasurer, J.B. Underwood. In 1972, Rosser became a candidate for the Secretary-Treasurer position, in direct opposition to her superior, Underwood.
She was subsequently disqualified as a candidate because she was not a
member of the union, and was discharged two days after Underwood was
re-elected to the Secretary-Treasurer position.
Rosser was nominated as a candidate by "a group of black union members whose announced purpose was to attempt to obtain better representation for black union members,"" said the EEOC in ruling that her discharge violated section 704(a) of Title VII. The trial court, while
disagreeing with the union's position that Rosser's candidacy and protest
of discrimination did not constitute "opposition" under section 704(a),
held her conduct to be outside the protection of section 704(a), stating:
While the court concludes that this section of Title VII protects employee opposition to unlawful practices beyond mere access to the EEOC,

the form of that opposition is not without bounds. Where the employee's
conduct in protest of illegal activity so interferes with the performance of

his job that it renders him ineffective in the position for which he was
employed, his conduct or form of opposition is not covered by Section
704(a) ....

In this case, Mrs. Rosser was employed as the dues posting clerk working directly under the supervision of the union's Secretary-Treasurer. His
effectiveness to a large degree depended on the plaintiff's cooperation. In
seeking election as Secretary-Treasurer, Mrs. Rosser placed her loyalty in
question. Where his effectiveness depends upon her cooperation, her active political opposition to his candidacy is a sufficient nondiscriminatory
cause for discharge."

A third recent decision of note is the First Circuit case of Monteiro v.
Poole Silver Co."8 Plaintiff was demoted from his lead position as a stone
buffer in 1972 and filed a race discrimination complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). This resulted in a
settlement memorandum which included a provision that plaintiff would
refrain from the continuing use of the word "discrimination."" The district court found that this provision was probably unenforceable, but that
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

616 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1980).
Rosser v. Laborers' Local 438, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1271, 1273 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
Id.
615 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1980).
Id. at 6.
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it nevertheless offered insight into the relationship that existed between
the plaintiff and his employer. 100 The year following plaintiff's reinstatement, he filed further grievances with the union alleging race discrimination and filed a charge with the EEOC over an incident involving a dispute with a supervisor. Later, when plaintiff was ordered back to his work
station by his supervisor, the plaintiff complained that the supervisor was
harassing him and discriminating against him. An argument ensued in
which plaintiff continued to accuse the supervisor of discrimination.
Plaintiff was fired and then filed another charge with the EEOC, claiming
retaliatory discharge.
The First Circuit held that the plaintiff must have good faith "opposition" to perceived employer misconduct in order to be protected by
704(a). The court stated:
[T]he plaintiff must show that his so-called opposition was in response to
some honestly held, if mistaken, feeling that discriminatory practices existed. In the field of labor relations we have held that while this filing of
a labor related civil action by employees is ordinarily a concerted activity
protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, the employees forfeit that protection by filing such an action in bad faith ....

Sec-

tion 704(a) is similarly unavailable to protect an employee who makes
unfounded claims of discrimination in order to excuse noncompliance
with legitimate employer demands. 10 1
The plaintiff's failure to show that his retaliation claim was sincerely
raised precluded the application of the section 704(a) protections under
this test.
Further, the section 704(a) safeguards do not always protect an employee who is discharged as a consequence of the employer's concern for
efficient management. In Pendleton v. Rumsfeld,102 plaintiffs Pendleton
and Martin were black female employees at Walter Reed Medical Center.
Pendleton was a GS-9 Chemist and Martin was a GS-7 Dictaphone Transcriber. Pendleton had been made a temporary Chief EEO counselor at a
GS-11 rating and Martin had been made a part-time EEO counselor. The
plaintiffs took an active role in a protest one day over alleged unlawful
employment practices and numerous grievances of employees.
The EEO counselor's handbook required counselors to maintain a
bridge between grievants and management, to maintain the confidence of
middle management, and to appreciate management's point of view.
Plaintiffs were removed from their EEO counselor positions because their
superior felt that they could no longer perform their function effectively
100. Id. at 6 n.3.
101. Id. at 8 (footnotes and citations omitted).
102. .F.2d.,
22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 15,073 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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after having actively participated in such a protest. In finding that the
Army acted lawfully in removing the two plaintiffs from their positions,
the court stated:
It seems fairly obvious that a reasonable person in General Moncrief's
position might, on learning of the plaintiffs' parts in the demonstration,
have felt that they had fatally compromised their ability to gain the confidence of middle management, as spelled out in the Handbook, and they
were lacking in ability to appreciate management's point of view or see
the facts as management saw them. . . . Without the confidence of middle management, a Counselor would be useless to top management, because he or she, having no authority to order anything done, could not
forestall formal grievance cases and get grievances settled early and at
low levels of authority.10
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' action in taking part in the
demonstration was not protected by section 704(a) of Title VII.
Gonzalez v. Bolger1" involved a suit instituted by a postal worker in
the Washington, D.C. main post office who, with five other employees,
formed a group to protest discriminatory treatment of employees by postal service management. Plaintiff, a Puerto Rican, felt that Spanish-surnamed individuals received harsher discipline than Caucasians. The post
office had a policy of allowing a reasonable amount of official time ("on
duty release time") for employees and their representatives to prepare
and present EEO complaints, and honored numerous requests by plaintiff
for release time.105 Release time was only denied to an employee when the
reason for requesting it was deemed to be unauthorized under official policy, or when the immediate work load was excessive. Whenever a request
for release time was denied, plaintiff would claim that the denial was a
reprisal for his EEO activity.
Plaintiff filed between forty and eighty complaints, charging twenty
different officials with such reprisals. He received two suspensions, as well
as lesser disciplinary action on numerous occasions, as a direct result of
confrontations with supervisors on EEO issues. The defendant's frequent
urging that plaintiff control his temper and seek appropriate relief
through peaceful channels was to no avail. Finally, plaintiff lost his temper over a refusal of his request for release time and refused to perform
his work. He was discharged.
In discussing the elements of a prima facie case, the court stated:
Although Congress plainly intended to provide broad protection for indi103. Id. at 15,077. See also Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d
1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
104. 486 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1980).
105. Id. at 597.
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viduals who complain of an employer's discriminatory conduct, it is
equally clear that such protection is not without limits. A court must
balance the Act's goal of encouraging reasonable expressed opposition to
employer discrimination against management's recognized prerogative to
maintain internal discipline and a stable working environment.'"6
Using this balancing approach, the court found that the plaintiff had exceeded the bounds of section 704(a) protection:
He was disrespectful both in manner and language, to supervisors and
also to EEO personnel. He deliberately disrupted the working environment when his demands were not met immediately. This behavior persisted over months, and in spite of periodic disciplinary measures as well
as warnings and counselling aimed at curbing his outbursts. Plaintiff's
militant self-help posture interfered with his employer's business objectives. It was in no way conducive to a frank exchange of ideas between
employer and employee, and served no redeeming statutory or policy
purpose. Plaintiff exceeded the tolerable limits of protected conduct.'
The termination, therefore, did not violate section 704(a). A similar principle emerged in King v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 1°" in which the court
found "that the opposition clause of section 704(a) does not protect
strikes by union members during working hours in violation of an existing
collective bargaining agreement," since unprotected activity includes unlawful activity or conduct disrupting co-workers or the work

environment.109
Thus, the federal courts appear to be reaching a more even-handed application of the provisions of section 704(a). Apparently, these courts now
realize that the statute can be used as a shield by a vindictive employee
unless retaliation claims are scrutinized with care. Indeed, there is authority that a section 704(a) plaintiff must come into court with "clean
hands" to seek Title VII's equitable remedies, 110 although the employer
cannot "create an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion"'' in order to
capitalize on that atmosphere by asserting that the plaintiff's claims are
106. Id. at 600-601.
107. Id. at 602. Cf. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979)
(court requiring employer to establish nondiscriminatory reason for taking action adverse to
plaintiff employee).
108. 476 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. M11.
1978).
109. Id. at 501. To the same effect, see EEOC v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 22 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1548 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
110. Women Employed v. Rinella & Rinella, 468 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(plaintiffs, employed by the defendant law firm, publicly harassed the firm's managing partner, invaded his privacy and damaged his reputation in the community through making
false statements and unsubstantiated charges).
111. See Rogers v. McCall, 22"Empl. Prac. Dec. 14,924 (D.D.C. 1980).
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unjustified. In general, the current posture of section 704(a) litigation is
one of even-handed application of the law, without undue presumptions
in either direction. However, the posture under other federal legislation
remains decidedly tilted in favor of the complainant, as the remainder of
this discussion shall demonstrate.

IV. THE FAlR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT
The Fair Labor Standards Act""' also contains a non-reprisal section.118
The Supreme Court, speaking in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry,
Inc.,"1 4 has made it clear that the shield of section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA is
to be construed to provide broad protections:
For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure
compliance with prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate
rights claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could
thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with
their grievances. This end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3) against discharges
and other discriminatory practices was designed to serve. For it needs no
argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate
to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions
... . By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in § 15(a)(3), and
its enforcement in equity by the Secretary pursuant to § 17, Congress
sought to foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced. 115
Acting under such a purpose, the applications of section 15(a)(3) have
been understandably liberal. As in the case of NLRA section 8(a)(4), jurisdiction, through the Act's wage and hour provisions, over the employer
or employee concerned is immaterial to the enforcement of the statutory
guarantees against reprisal."" In furtherance of this protection, employ112. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976) provides:
(a) After the expiration of one hundred and twenty days from June 25, 1938, it
shall be unlawful for any person(3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about
to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry
committee.
114. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
115. Id. at 292 (citation omitted).
116. Wirtz v. Ross Packaging Co., 367 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1966); Mitchell v. Equitable
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ees have even been allowed to employ fictitious names in filing suit, at

least until such time as the employer became entitled to discovery.'11
Prior to 1977, the aggrieved individual was afforded no individual right
to sue as a remedy for retaliatory conduct. Only the Secretary of Labor
was empowered to seek relief under the statute.1 8 This was changed by
the 1977 amendments to the Act. '"9 The statute protects testimony in a
criminal proceeding brought pursuant to the Act 1 2 0 and applies to "any
person" engaged in the retaliatory acts. 21 The section does not extend to
shield those who take part in no "proceeding under or relating to the

Act,"

2

but the courts have not agreed on the question of whether the

voluntary resignation of the employee bars his later reinstatement under
section 15(a)(3).12 3

Three illustrations will aid the understanding of the section 15(a)(3)
protection. First, under a bizarre set of facts in Brennan v. Maxey's

Yamaha, Inc.,"'4 the Eighth Circuit held that an employer had engaged in

Beneficial Life, Health & Acc. Co., 34 Lab. Cas. 96,113, 96,476 (D.N.J. 1958) (Findings of
fact and conclusions of law).
117. Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973). In this suit by migrant
farm workers, the court stated:
This manner of proceeding is most often utilized when there is the strong likelihood that the party would be held up to public ridicule or scorn.
In other cases, suits have been brought by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of
unnamed persons .... In these cases the Secretary, relying upon his governmental privilege, need not divulge the names of the real plaintiffs and thereby protects
them from possible reprisal actions. 60 F.R.D. at 107.
118. Martinez v. Behring's Bearing Serv., Inc., 501 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974); Bonner v.
Elizabeth Arden Inc., 177 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1949); Powell v. Washington Post Co., 168 F.
Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1958), affd 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959). But
see Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305
F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976), as amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 10, 91 Stat. 1245; Reeves v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
__F.2d_
(5th Cir. 1980); Bush v. State Indus., Inc., 599 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1979);
Pedreya v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1979).
120. Wirtz v. Home News Pub. Co., 341 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 823
(1965).
121. See, e.g., Meek v. United States, 136 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1943) (father-in-law of employer guilty of "aiding and abetting"); Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc., 137 F.2d 37 (3d Cir.
1943) (labor union); Dunlop v. South Glens Falls Lumber Co., 78 Lab. Cas. 47,349
(N.D.N.Y. 1976) (company attorney); Mitchell v. Crawford Prod. Co., 31 Lab. Cas. 93,057
(N.D. Okla. 1956) (lessor causing lessee to refuse to hire).
122. Fleming v. Stillman, 48 F. Supp. 609, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1943).
123. Compare, Wirtz v. Valentine Lumber Co., 236 F. Supp. 616 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (no
standing), with Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 800 (M.D. Ga. 1957),
aff'd without discussion of this issue, 260 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds,
361 U.S. 288 (1960).
124. 513 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1975).
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illegal retaliation by firing an employee (Holman) who had made an issue

out of the employer's demand that she endorse over her overtime back
pay check to the firm as "a loan." The court stated:
While some employees cashed their checks at Maxey's, voluntarily
loaned the cash directly back to the company, and apparently ended up
owning part of the business, Holman was given no unfettered choice.
While Holman's outburst and emotional conduct apparently played a
role in her discharge, she did have a clear right to protest the antics and
tactics employed by Maxey's in complying with the Act's demands ....
Since Holman's interpretation, although erroneous, was reasonable, the
fault lies with Maxey's .... Holman therefore should be compensated
for the loss in wages she suffered as a result of her unlawful dismissal."'
Second, a discharge for refusal to sign a form acknowledging receipt of
back overtime pay before it was actually paid was found retaliatory in
Dunlop v. South Glens Falls Lumber Co."26 Finally, one recent case held
that a former employer did not violate the Act in informing another com-

pany that a complaint had been filed by an ex-employee against the former.'" This action resulted in a rejection of the ex-employee's application, but the court found no infirmity under section 15(a)(3) because the
statute prohibits discrimination against an "employee" rather than "a
former employee." This rather novel interpretation was reversed on
8

appeal.

1
2

The Equal Pay Act of 1963"2 (EPA) is really no more than an amendment to FLSA which extends the latter statute to protect females against

wage discrimination. Thus, the general provisions of FLSA section
15(a)(3) are applicable in EPA cases as well. For some reason, there have
been almost no reported EPA reprisal cases,"30 but the FLSA precedents

125. Id. at 183. Following an investigation by the Wage-Hour Division, the employer
promptly had made payment for alleged overtime violations but had asked five of the nine
affected employees to "loan" the money back to the company. Judith Holman argued, to the
court's satisfaction, that she felt this conduct had been a scheme to circumvent the purposes
of the Act.
126. 78 Lab. Cas. 47,349, (N.D.N.Y. 1976). Compare, Smith v. Rexall Drug Co., 415 F.
Supp. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd 548 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1977 (signed termination agreement), with Stevens v. Junior College Dist., 410 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (poor working
habits), aff'd, 548 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1977).
127. Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 78 Lab. Cas. 47,229 (N.D. Ohio 1975), rev'd, 548
F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
128. Id.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
130. Marshall v. Georgia Southwestern College, 489 F. Supp. 1322 (M.D. Ga. 1980),
Pedreya v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1979) (Title
VII and FLSA) and Brennan v. Braswell Mtr. Freight Lines, 396 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Tex.
1975) are decisions in point. Many Title VII complaints alleging sex discrimination add a
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are apparently equally applicable.

V. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT
Unlike the EPA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19671"'
(ADEA) provides a statutory framework which is independent of, although in most respects, analogous to, the provisions of FLSA. In accordance with this scheme, ADEA has its own non-retaliation provision. Section 4(d) of the Act"'s prohibits reprisals against those who oppose "any
practice made unlawful by this section," as well as those who have "made
a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or litigation under this chapter." 3 In contrast to the
original language of the FLSA, private enforcement of these rights is expressly contemplated.'"
Inasmuch as the filing of a notice with the Secretary of Labor of an
intention to sue"s5 precipitates a conciliation effort almost immediately,
the likelihood of reprisals is somewhat lessened, and the lack of section
4(d) cases bears this out. At this point, it is uncertain whether the FLSA
precedents or Title VII precedents will be more readily applied under section 4(d). Comparison of the language of section 4(d) with section
15(a)(3) of FLSA and with section 704(a) of Title VII reveals that section
4(d) is identical to section 704(a), and differs from section 15(a)(3) in several material respects: First, section 15(a)(3) applies to "any person,"
while sections 704(a) and 4(d) apply only to employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies; ' " Second, the FLSA only protects "emcount based on Equal Pay Act violations, as in Pedreya, supra. However, since the Fair
Labor Standards Act allowed no private action for reprisal, private plaintiffs who relied on
both statutes were relegated to only the provisions of § 704(a) of Title VII for suits challenging retaliatory conduct prior to 1977. See, Hoggard v. Guard Pub. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 1179 (D. Ore. 1976).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1976).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against
any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member
thereof or applicant for membership, because such individual, member or applicant for membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or
because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or litigation under this chapter.
133. Id.
134. ADEA § 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976).
135. The notice is jurisdictional prerequisite for later suit. See generally, ADEA § 7(d),
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976), and inter alia, Law v. United Air Lines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th
Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974).
136. The materiality of this distinction is not apparent, however.
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ployees," while the provisions of ADEA and Title VII shield "employees
or applicants for employment," "members or applicants for membership"
of a labor organization, and (as to employment agencies only) "any individual;"18 7 Finally, the ADEA and Title VII include a catch-all proviso on
behalf of those who "participate in any manner" in the enforcement of
the statute, but the FLSA only covers those who "filed any complaint,"
"instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding," "testified or are
about to testify," or "served or are about to serve on an industry committee." " Conceivably, therefore, the scope of the FLSA non-retaliation section is slightly more narrow than that of the other two statutes, and Title
VII, rather than FLSA, should provide guidance for the court in cases
brought pursuant to section 4(d) of the ADEA.
VI. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970"89 contains in its section 11(c)(1)1'4 language which is somewhat sui generis:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or
has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of
the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right
afforded by this chapter."

Up to the final clause, this section reads in haec verba with the language
of section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA. The final clause, with its broad-brush
protection of the "exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or
others of any right afforded by this chapter," is not found in any of the
statutes heretofore discussed although it may well be implied thereby.
However, the Secretary of Labor, in issuing regulations concerning
OSHA's non-reprisal guarantees,' has purported to base those regulations on "the body of law developed under the National Labor Relations
Act."' While the distinction between the language of the statute and
137. Cf., Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 78 Lab. Cas. 47,229 (former employees not protected under FLSA), rev'd, 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
138. See text accompanying notes 130-132 supra, indicating coverage of FLSA to extend
beyond explicitly enumerated conduct.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1976).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976). See generally O'Reilly, Job-Related Discrimination
and Discharge Under the Federal Safety Statutes, 24 LAB. L.J. 718 (1973).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976).
142. 29 C.F.R. § 1977 (1979).
143. B. Fellner & D. Saveson, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH-LAw AND PRACTICE 280
(1976). This statement is largely inaccurate, since many cases cited in the regulations are
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that of the regulations is for the most part unremarkable, at least one
provision in the regulations merits attention. An applicant for employment is deemed an "employee,"1 44 despite the Act's somewhat redundant
definition of "employee" in section 3(6).145
Enforcement of these rights is the sole responsibility of the Secretary of
Labor. An aggrieved employee has thirty days after the incident complained of within which to file a complaint with the Secretary, whereupon
an investigation must be instituted. The Secretary is required to bring a
civil action in federal district court if retaliatory discrimination is found
in the investigation. 146 The Secretary must, in any event, notify the complainant of the determination of violation vel non within ninety days of
14 7
receipt of the complaint.
In addition to the interpretive rules mentioned above, the Secretary
has also promulgated procedural requirements for Labor Department
field personnel to employ in handling complaints of discrimination. In
Field Information Memorandum No. 75-1,148 Chapter VI, section A.2.d(1)
of the OSHA Field Operations Manual was called to the attention of Assistant Regional Directors: "For purposes of submitting a complaint, an
'employee' would normally be a present employee of the employer whose
establishment is being complained about. However, in some circumstances, it may be a former employee; for example, where the employee
may have been discriminatorily discharged for a complaint .... 149
Procedural methods for handling section 11(c) complaints were set out in
a series of Program Directives150 under which a determination not to sue
can be appealed by the complainant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, whose decision is final. Despite the mandate of the Act that suit "shall be" brought, settlement
short of litigation is to be encouraged.15 1
Apparently these settlement procedures have furthered "voluntary"
compliance with section 11(c). Only two reported cases have directly applied the section's provisions, although the NLRB has held that a violaFLSA, rather than NLRA, precedents.
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b) (1979), relying on NLRB v. Lamar Creamery, 246 F.2d 8 (5th
Cir. 1957).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1976): "The term 'employee' means an employee of an employer
who is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce."
146. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(3) (1976). The Secretary has taken the position that the 90-day
notification period is only "directory," 29 C.F.R. § 1977.16 (1979).
148. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 1 9628.
149. Id.
150. OSHA Prog. Dir. No. 74-14, (Oct. 9, 1974), supplemented by, OSHA Prog. Dir. No.
75-5 (Apr. 23, 1975).
151. OSHA Prog. Dir. No. 75-5, para. 3(i).
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tion of section 11(c) may also constitute a violation of NLRA section
8(a)(1). 152 The first, Brennan v. Alan Wood Steel Co.,15s involved an employee whose discharge for refusal to work on an allegedly unsafe piece of

equipment had been reduced by an arbitrator to reinstatement without
back pay. Since the employee had also filed an OSHA complaint, the
court saw no reason to defer to the arbitrator's decision, relying on the

OSHA regulations,5 and denied the employer's motion to dismiss the
complaint.
The second case, Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms, Inc., " is also procedural in nature. The employer argued that the lack of notice to the employer of the possibility of suit was violative of due process, that the absence of a pre-suit hearing was also constitutionally infirm, and that a
jury trial was required. These arguments were rejected, as was the contention that a former employee had no rights under section 11(c). In making this latter decision, the court noted that a complaint about the same
conditions had been made to a legal services corporation before the discharge, thus sidestepping the question of the applicability of the statute
to former employees. 156
An interesting peripheral application of section 11(c) is the D.C. Circuit's decision in Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp.157 In the course of a unionprecipitated OSHA inspection of Mobil's Paulsboro, New Jersey refinery,
four employees who were members of the complaining union joined the
inspector in a "walkaround." When Mobil subsequently refused to pay
the employees for the time they spent, they filed a section 11(c) complaint with the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary found no violation of
the Act: although the "walkaround" itself was a right protected by
OSHA, " this right was not denied; all the employer had done was to
deny compensation for the time in question."
152. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975); C&I Air Conditioning, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 911, 78 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1972).
153. [1975-1976] OSH DEC. (CCH) 1 20,136 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
154. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18 (1979).
155. [1976-19771 OSH DEc. (CCH) 1 20,217 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
156. The court also observed that the conditions complained of had been pointed out to
the employee prior to the discharge, which, under the Secretary's regulations (29 C.F.R. §
1977.9(c) (1979)), would preclude discharge "if [the complaint were] made in good faith."
This superimposition of a good-faith requirement, while salutory, is not expressly sanctioned by the statute, although it may be inferred through reference to non-OSHA precedents. See also Marshall v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1977),
and Usery v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 76-4048-M (D. Mass., Nov. 12, 1976).
157. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'g, 377 F. Supp. 1302 (D.D.C. 1974). See also
Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, __F.2d
, 8 OSHC 1648 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1970).
159. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.21(a) (1975) and Electronic Research Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 778, 77
L.R.R.M. 1324 (1971).
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Having no right to sue under OSHA, the employees instead brought an
action under section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act,'"
alleging that Mobil had violated its collective bargaining agreement with
their union. Mobil's motion for summary judgment was granted, 161 and
plaintiffs appealed. While the court of appeals concluded that deferral to
arbitration of the question was not required, the district court was
affirmed:
Whatever indirect benefits employers may reap from OSHA inspections,
the imminent threat of citations and fines does not encourage employers
to applaud or approve the actions of employees who are pointing out violations to the OSHA inspector. It is undoubtedly this possibility of immediate conflict between employer and employee interests which led
Congress to protect employees who exercise OSHA participation rights
from discriminatory treatment ... [but) [w]ithout proof of direct benefit and employer control, the principles of FLSA do not, even apart from
the provisions of OSHA, require compensation.' 2
Early this year, the Supreme Court issued a unamimous decision which
touches upon the issues discussed in this section, but which may leave
more questions unanswered than were resolved. In Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall,'" the precise issue was the validity of the Labor Department's
regulation,'" promulgated under authority of OSHA section 11(c)(1),'"
which prohibited an employer from discharging or discriminating against
any employee who had exercised "any right afforded by" the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Two Whirlpool employees were directed to
perform their regular job duties, but the two refused, contending that the
working conditions under which the job would be performed were unsafe.
As a result, the two were given written reprimands and lost six hours' pay
each.
When the Secretary of Labor sued, arguing that the reprimands and
loss of pay were violative of section 11(c)(1), the trial court dismissed.
The regulation, said the court, was inconsistent with the Act and therefore invalid.'" Consequently, even though the regulation justified the
workers' refusal, their conduct was not protected by the statute. The
Sixth Circuit reversed the invalidation of the regulation.1 67 This decision
160. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
161. 377 F. Supp. 1302 (D.D.C. 1974).
162. 523 F.2d at 1163-64. For a retaliation decision under the Federal Coal Mine Health
& Safety Act, see Lambert v. Carbon Fuel Co., [1976-77] OSH DEc. (CCH) 1 21,360 (1976).
163. 100 S. Ct. 883 (1980).
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1979).

165. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976).
166. Usery v. Whirlpool Corp., 416 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
167. 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979).
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was appealed and certiorari was granted only on the validity of the regulation'" inasmuch as the Sixth Circuit's conclusion conflicted with two
other appellate decisions.""
The court's resolution of the conflict rested on narrow grounds. Employee "self-help" through refusal to perform assigned work would be justified, said the court,
when (1) the employee is ordered by his employer to work under conditions that the employee reasonably believes pose an imminent risk of
death or serious bodily injury, and (2) the employee has reason to believe
that there is not sufficient time or opportunity either to seek170effective
redress from his employer or to apprise OSHA of the danger.
This restrained approach was to some degree dictated by the regulation
itself, which conceded that "as a general matter, there is no right afforded
by the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because of
potential unsafe conditions at the workplace. ' 1 7 1 Even though Congress
had rejected a "strike with pay" provision in enacting OSHA,1 7 the court
refused to accept Whirlpool's argument that this congressional action
manifested an intention "to avoid giving employees a unilateral authority
to walk off the job which they might abuse in order to intimidate or harass their employer. 1 7 8 Instead, said the court, the regulation only prohibited discrimination and did not "require employers to pay workers who
1' 74
refuse to perform their assigned tasks in the face of imminent danger.
"Moreover, any employee who acts in reliance on the regulation runs the
risk of discharge or reprimand in the event a court subsequently finds
1' 75
that he acted unreasonably or in bad faith.
Following the Whirlpool decision, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Marshall v. N. L. Industries, Inc.?6 is especially significant. The Secretary of Labor sued N.L. for an alleged violation of OSHA section 11(c)(1)
in terminating an employee for his refusal to work under allegedly unsafe
conditions. The trial court, upon being advised that an arbitrator had reinstated the employee without back pay, granted summary judgment for
the company.
While an appeal was under advisement, Whirlpool was decided. The
168.
169.
Daniel
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

100 S. Ct. 43 (1979); see 100 S. Ct. at 888 n.10.
Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., 7 OSHC 1069 (10th Cir. 1978); Marshall v.
Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1977).
100 S. Ct. at 890.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1) (1979).
H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 116 CONG. Rzc. 38376, 38377-38378, 38707 (1970).
100 S. Ct. at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895.
618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980).
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Seventh Circuit then reversed the district court's ruling and remanded,
stating:
In Whirlpool Corp., the Supreme Court specifically upheld the validity

of the Secretary's regulation, which proscribes any discrimination in response to an employee's good faith refusal to expose himself to conditions he reasonably believes are dangerous. Here, as in the pure labor
context, firing an employee for refusing to undertake such work clearly
constitutes discrimination. Therefore, for defendant to be liable, the Secretary need prove only that [the employee] had a reasonable and good
faith belief that the conditions leading to his refusal to dump the 1lead
77
were dangerous and that defendant discharged him for that refusal.
Accordingly, said the court, "back pay is an appropriate remedy for a
discriminatory and therefore unlawful discharge." 17 8
But the Supreme Court's assumption that a "court" will assure the reasonableness of the employee's refusal to work holds true only if OSHA
section 11(c)(1) is the basis under which the employee seeks protection.
Suppose the employee selected the protections of the federal labor laws
instead. Section 502 of Taft-Hartley' 7 9 provides that "quitting of labor
. ..

in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions" is not a

strike.'s" The NLRB, whether with or without reference to section 502,
has been prone to conclude that a withholding of work due to alleged
safety hazards constitutes conduct protected by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act 81 and, therefore, that disciplinary action against
such protesters violates section 8(a)(1). 181
Thus, in NLRB v. Modern CarpetIndustries, Inc., 88 the Tenth Circuit
enforced a Board order'" which had found a violation of section 8(a)(1)
177. Id. at 1224.
178. Id.
179. Labor-Management Relations Act, § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
180. Compare Long-Airdox Co. v. UAW Local 772, 622 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1980) (employees' refusal to cross a picket line is an arbitrable dispute even though employees claimed §
502 applied because they "feared violence from hostile pickets") with NLRB Advice Mem.,
[1978-79] NLRB (CCH) 20,223 (1978) (concerted activity and OSHA claims do not bring §
502 into play). See also Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Plain Dealer Pub.
Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 909 (1976); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1975);
Clark Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. United Bd. of Carpenters, 510 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1975); Pence
Constr. Corp. v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs Local 450, 484 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 464 F.2d 565 (8th
Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927
(1958).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
183. 611 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1979).
184. 236 N.L.R.B. 1014, 98 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1978).

1981]

"SQUEAKY WHEEL" EMPLOYEE

in the discharge of three employees who refused to work with lead storage
containers, despite the employer's contention that the workers' fears were
"unreasonable." As the court put it,
The cases hold that the merits of the underlying dispute are irrelevant to
the determination of whether a "labor dispute" exists or not. In NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 8 L.Ed.2d 298
(1962), the Supreme Court ... said that "reasonableness of workers' decisions to engage in concerted activity is irrelevant to the determination
of whether a labor dispute exists or not."1 85
Therefore, the court said that "[t]he only question of fact then that was
presented was whether or not the employees in good faith believed that
working with the radioactive lead was dangerous." Since the court found
"every reason to believe that they were in good faith" and "no reason to
suspect that they were not," the employer's conduct violated their section
7 rights. 1 The court then provided an advisory statement which, although dictum, displaces the prevailing current attitude: If indeed the
lead was harmless, management could at least have told the employees
who had made the appraisal or, better still, could have made a statement
187
in writing assuming liability for any harm that might be sustained.
Perhaps the most outrageous extension of section 8(a)(1) protection for
"safety" complaints is found in Allied Aviation Service Co. of New
Jersey, Inc.' " An airline employee wrote a letter to customers of his employer, claiming that the company's refueling technique was unsafe.
There was a grievance pending concerning the refueling procedure, but it
was not safety-related. Even so, the Board held that, since the underlying
issue constituted an "ongoing labor dispute," the letter was protected by
the Act even though there was a strong inference that the employee had
been motivated by a malicious intention to injure his employer's business.
The message of this comparison is clear. With such an expansive reading of section 8(a)(1), why should an employee waste his time with complaining to OSHA about retaliation, particularly in light of the necessity
of a civil action in federal court, brought by the Labor Department, to
vindicate rights under OSHA section 11(c)(1)? The paucity of section
11(c)(1) cases and the volume of section 8(a)(1) cases attest to the fact
185. 611 F.2d at 814, quoting, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16
(1962). To the same effect, see Du-Tri Displays, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 1261, 97 L.R.R.M. 1139
(1977) (threat to obtain a NIOSH study is protected) and Alleluia Cushion Co., 221
N.L.R.B. 999, 91 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1975) (complaint to OSHA). See also Abay-Wood Indus.,
Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1980); Kiechler Mfg. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 99 L.R.R.M. 1578
(Sept. 26, 1978).

186. 611 F.2d at 814-815.
187. Id. at 815.
188. 248 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 103 L.R.R.M. 1454 (Mar. 10, 1980).
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that American employees have heard the message.
VII.

SECTION 8(A)(4) AND THE "TESTIMONIAL" PROTECTION

"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to discharge
or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this subchapter."' 9 This provision is
one of the least-litigated aspects of federal labor law, 19° and is completely
ignored in the most-used casebooks. 191 Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's liberalized reading of section 8(a)(4) in NLRB v. Scrivener,'"
however, the real emphasis in NLRB litigation is not upon the narrowlydefined language of section 8(a)(4), but rests upon the provisions of section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Before turning to the statutory language of the
latter provision, it is instructive to study the uses to which section 8(a)(4)
has been put.
A.

The Pre-Scrivener Decisional Law

First, it should be recognized that the National Labor Relations Act,
unlike the other federal statutes discussed herein, neither creates nor implies a civil remedy for purposes of judicial enforcement. Although the
Act prescribes a criminal penalty for retaliatory discrimination, 19' it has
been held that the administrative procedures of the Act pre-empt any
independent judicial proceedings.'" Thus, charges of retaliatory conduct
must be processed through the filing of an unfair labor practice charge
with the NLRB, followed by a decision by the Regional Director, the issuance of a complaint, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge1 "
(ALU) and the subsequent issuance of a recommended decision by the
ALJ,intra-Board appeals, and then an appeal or petition for enforcement
to a United States Court of Appeals.
189. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
190. Less than 4% of all unfair labor practice charges filed during Fiscal Year 1977 alleged § 8(a)(4) violations, while only .7% involved § 8(a)(4) "alone." (§ 8(a)(1) charges are
usually made in conjunction with any other charge under § 8(a)). 42nd Ann. Rep., NLRB,
269 (1977).
191. A. Cox & D.C. BOK, CASES AD MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW (8th ed. 1977); R.A.
SMrr, L.S. MERRIuFRmw
& T.J. ST. ANToINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
(5th ed. 1974). But see 3 T. KHEL, LABOR LAW § 12.04 (1973).
192. 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
193. NLRA § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 162 (1976).
194. Lankford v. International Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs., 196 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1960),
afl'd per curiam, 293 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Van Zandt v. McKee, 202 F.2d 490
(5th Cir. 1953); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.
1948).
195. Formerly designated as a Trial Examiner,
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Before Scrivener, the enforcement attitude of both the NLRB and the
appellate courts had been somewhat at odds with the apparent meaning
of section 8(a)(4). The leading decision in this area had been Judge Vogel's opinion in NLRB v. Ritchie Mfg. Co. 1 " In that case, it was said:
Respondent contends that the Board failed to sustain its burden of proof
in support of its contention that Feltz was discharged because he gave
testimony or filed charges under § 8(a)(4) ....

The primary reason for

this assertion is that, in fact, no testimony was ever given or charges ever
filed by Feltz against respondent. The most that Feltz did was to prepare
to testify ....

We are reluctant to hold that § 8(a)(4) can be extended

to cover preliminary preparations for giving testimony.'97

The court noted that prior cases concerning testimonial rights under section 8(a)(4) "have invariably involved situations in which an employee
has actually testified at a hearing."'" While it is not entirely accurate to
state that the rule was "invariably" applied,'" and even though the companion question of discrimination against charging parties (as distinguished from witnesses) was not squarely addressed by the court, Judge
Vogel's reliance on the cited decisions seems entirely justified as to the
limited proposition that testimony is necessary for witness protection
under section 8(a)(4).200
But the Board began to waver from its earlier position after Ritchie. In
Hydraflow Valve & Manufacturing Co.,101 an announced intention to file
a charge, followed by discharge, was found to be a violation of section
8(a)(4). Further, despite the Sixth Circuit's statement in Hoover Design
Corp. v. NLRB,'0 that threatening to file charges was not supported by
case law as a basis for section 8(a)(4) protection, the NLRB accepted a
trial examiner's findings of section 8(a)(4) violation in discharging an employee for the "assertion that he would seek Board processes.'"0 Similar
196. 354 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1965).
197. Id. at 101.
198. Id., citing, Nachman Corp. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. DalTex Optical Co., 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Southern Bleachery & Print Wks.,
Inc., 257 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911 (1959); NLRB v. Viking Pump
Co., 113 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 680 (1941).
199. See, e.g., Laredo Daily Times, 58 N.L.R.B. 458, 15 L.R.R.M. 45 (1944) (discriminatory to discharge employee who refused to sign statement that he would not proceed with or
appear at Board hearing).
200. See English Mica Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 766, 27 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1950) (presence at hearing, without testimony, affords no protection).
201. 158 N.L.R.B. 730, 62 L.R.R.M. 1203 (1966).
202. 402 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1968), denying enforcement in part of, 167 N.L.R.B. 461, 66
L.R.R.M. 1074 (1967).
203. Moulton Shirt Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 882, 69 L.R.R.M. 1516 (1968).
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results were reached in a 1971 Board case, UAW Local 933,204 in which
statements made to a Board agent were held to trigger section 8(a)(4)
protection. Nonetheless, there was little indication that the law had undergone a metamorphosis in the six years since Ritchie. Thus, the Eighth
Circuit in NLRB v. Scrivener 0 1 reiterated that decision in a per curiam
denial of enforcement of a Board decision. Quoting Ritchie'0 6 as support
for the proposition that the court is reluctant to extend section 8(a)(4),
the court then stated: "This reluctance continues. ' 207
B.

NLRB v. Scrivener

That reluctance did not persuade the Board. The NLRB persisted, this
time filing a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition and, in a surprising opinion, reversed the court of appeals.' 8 Mr.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for a unamimous court, stated six reasons for
the reversal: (1) a contrary result would dissuade witnesses from providing information to the NLRB;2" (2) the phrase "or otherwise discriminate" in section 8(a)(4) indicates the need for a broad construction of the
subsection; '10 (3) Executive Order 6711,111 issued under the National Industrial Recovery Act,2 ' 2 had been extended by the first Labor Board to
1
include "the giving of information relating to violations of the NIRA,";' 3
(4) "the practicalities of appropriate agency action" mandate such an interpretation; 14 (5) the employees' discharge would have been prohibited
204. 193 N.L.R.B. 223, 78 L.R.R.M. 1663 (1971). See Note, 8 Wake Forest L. Rev. 141
(1971).
205. NLRB v. Scrivener, 435 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1971).
206. Id., quoting 354 F.2d 90, 101. "We are reluctant to hold that § 8(a)(4) can be extended to cover preliminary preparations for giving testimony."
207. 435 F.2d at 1296. The discharge in Scrivener was based on the giving of written,
sworn statements to Board agents.
208. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
209. 405 U.S. at 121-22, citing, Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967)
("Congress has made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about [unfair labor]
practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting them to the Board.")
210. 405 U.S. at 122. This argument seems to be a non sequitur.
211. X NRA Codes of Fair Competition 949 (May 15, 1934).
212. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), found unconstitutionalin A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (the "Sick
Chicken Case").
213. 405 U.S. at 122-23, citing, New York Rapid Transit Corp., I N.L.R.B. 192 (1934),
and Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., II N.L.R.B. 802, 1 L.R.R.M. 59 (1937). The Court rejected
any argument that NIRA's protection of "making a complaint or giving evidence" was
broader than the Wagner Act's § 8(a)(4), citing the legislative history to conclude that §

8(a)(4) was "merely a reiteration" of E.O. 6711. I NLRB,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NA-

LABOR RELATONS Acr at 1355 (Senate Committee Print, 1949).
214. 405 U.S. at 123-24.
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had they been subpoenaed, rather than volunteering to testify;1 6 and,
finally, (6) that the "approach to section 8(a)(4) generally has been a liberal one in order fully to effectuate the section's remedial purpose.""s 6
It is this final arrow in the Court's quiver of reasons which is most open
to debate. While the first five points can be seen as a means to a predetermined end, the utilization of two previous Fifth Circuit decisions as
precedent for the sixth point manifests an inattention to detail in the
interest of buttressing a conclusion with the foundation of stare decisis.
In M&S Steel Co. v. NLRB,"17 the Supreme Court says that "section
8(a)(4) was violated by the discharge of an employee. . . because he gave
2
a statement to a field examiner,""'
while in NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 1' the Court asserts that the protected employee "appeared but did
not testify."' "
The Court is in error. The court in M&S Steel enforced the Board's
findings""' in a per curiam order which made no mention of section
8(a)(4).'" The court in Dal-Tex (which was one of the decisions relied on
in Ritchie) was concerned with four employees who testified and another
employee who was subpoenaed but whose testimony was not received on
grounds that it would be cumulative. The latter employee was demoted,
rather than discharged, and no section 8(a)(4) finding as to him was made
by the court."s
Two other cases were cited by the Court as supportive of the reversal.
Neither was directly on point, for in both John Hancock Mutual Life Co.
v. NLRB,' 4 and NLRB v. Syracuse Stamping Co."'1 the party involved
had been either rejected or discharged, filed a charge and had a reapplication denied on the basis of that charge. The foregoing does not mean, of
course, that the Supreme Court was "wrong" inits reversal of the Eighth
Circuit. However, the effort to substantiate that result by reference to
precedent and statutory construction obfuscates the fact that the Court
was charting a new course under section 8(a)(4).

215. Id. at 124, citing, 29 U.S.C. § 161 and Pederson v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417, 420 (2d Cir.
1956).
216. 405 U.S. at 124.
217. 353 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1965).
218. 405 U.S. at 125.
219. 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1962).
220. 405 U.S. at 125.
221. 148 N.L.R.B. 789, 57 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1964).
222. The Fifth Circuit only spoke of section 8(a)(1) violations, and references to section
8(a)(4) in the trial examiner's opinion are at best cryptic.
223. The Fifth Circuit erred as to the identity of the non-testifying witness, but it is
unclear what impact this may have had on the decision.
224. 191 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
225. 208 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1953).
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C. Post-Scrivener Extensions of Section 8(a)(4)
The Board lost no time in broadening the parameters of section 8(a)(4)
protection even more. In Maple City Stamping Co.,2" it was found that a
discharge based on the unfounded suspicion that an employee had filed
charges was protected by the section. In Commerce Concrete Co., 2 7 presence of the later-discharged employee at the union counsel's table in a
representation proceeding was deemed sufficient to supply a nexus between the discharge and activity protected by section 8(a)(4). Sworn
statements to Board agents were again found protected in King Louie
Bowling Corp.,"' and the Eighth Circuit, in light of Scrivener, was forced
to agree.
But the Board declined to extend section 8(a)(4) protection to two employees who had been discharged for two days' unexcused absence, although the reason for their absence was attendance at an NLRB representation hearing at which they had testified. The trial examiner found,
and the Board agreed, that the employees' failure to clock out violated a
valid company rule and justified the assumption that the employees were
seeking to be paid for time not worked.2' On the other hand, section
8(a)(4) was held to be violated where an employer reprimanded five employees for being absent from work two hours before a Board hearing,
where two of the employees who testified at that hearing were subsequently discharged2" Contrast this holding with the one of GTE Lenkurt, Inc.,21 wherein the Board saw no infringement of section 8(a)(4)
protected rights in a supervisor's advice to an employee that the latter's
"image" would not be helped if he filed Board charges about "foolish"
things.'23
A more recent case in the Scrivener mold is General Nutrition Center,
226. 200 N.L.R.B. 743, 82 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1972); Accord, First National Bank & Trust
Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 95, 85 L.R.R.M. 1324 (1974) enforced without opinion, 505 F.2d 729 (3d
Cir. 1974) (belief that employee had filed or was going to fie charges). See also Rolite, Inc.,
183 N.L.R.B. 390, 74 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1970); Inland Motors, 177 N.L.R.B. 297, 72 L.R.R.M.
1128 (1969); Alum-A-Form, 176 N.L.R.B. 1063, 71 L.R.R.M. 1544 (1969).
227. 197 N.L.R.B. 658, 80 L.RR.M. 1811 (1972).
228. 196 N.L.R.B. 390, 80 L.R.R.M. 1358 (1972), remanded on other grounds, 472 F.2d
1192 (8th Cir. 1973).
229. John Wanamaker, Philadelphia, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 1266, 82 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1972).
230. Fuqua Homes, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 399, 87 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1974). Cf. Steel-Fab, Inc.,
212 N.L.R.B. 169, 87 L.R.R.M. 1752 (1974) (telling employee that he is on the employer's
"list" for having testified, followed by denial of overtime, violates section 8(a)(4).
231. 215 N.L.R.B. 321, 88 L.R.R.M. 1409 (1974).
232. The same employee also contended that he had been discharged as a result of filing

charges with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Although this argument

was rejected, this issue is closely intertwined with matters discussed in the text accompanying notes 143-168 supra.
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non-union employer discharged four employees and a supervisor

who announced their intention to complain to the NLRB about working
conditions. Such discharges, the Board said, were prohibited by section
8(a)(4) since condoning the discharges could foreseeably deter others
from engaging in the "protected activity" of consulting the NLRB.
D. Other Ramifications of Section 8(a)(4)
The preceding resume of recent Board decisions on the testimonial aspects of section 8(a)(4) has generally bypassed discussion of the protection for charging parties. While each decision hinges on its own particular

facts, and while the Board is zealous (sometimes to a fault) in debunking
"pretextual" justifications for retaliatory conduct, six general principles

have emerged:
(1) All witnesses and charging parties are protected. As the Second Circuit explained in Pederson v. NLRB,'" a subpoenaed supervisor is enti-

tled to section 8(a)(4) safeguards. "Unless there is a clear Congressional
mandate to the contrary the Board should be required to utilize every
resource at its command to protect witnesses ...

who have been placed

in jeopardy because the Board has required them to appear and give testimony. ' ""3 Also included in the zone of protection are employees on
whose behalf a union has filed charges,'" and even immediate relatives of
charging parties."s 7

(2) The "or otherwise discipline" language of section 8(a)(4) is to be
broadly construed. Among employer actions which have been found retaliatory are failure to rehire2' or hire, s" transfer or layoff,240 change of po233. 221 N.L.R.B. 850, 90 L.R.R.M. 1736 (1975).
234. 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956). Accord, King Radio Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 649, 65
L.R.R.M. 1646 (1967), enforced on other grounds, 398 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1968).
235. Id. at 420.
236. Thomas Engine Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 1029, 73 L.R.R.M. 1289, enforced on other
grounds sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1971); Vogue Lingerie, Inc. v.
NLRB, 280 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1969).
237. North Dixie Theatre, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1977) (daughter); NLRB
v. Dewey Bros., 80 L.R.R.M. 2112 (4th Cir. 1972) (wife employed in another plant); Consolidated Foods Corp. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1968) (wife); Serv-Air Aviation, 111
N.L.R.B. 689, 35 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1955) (wife); E.R. Goddard & Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 849, 32
L.R.R.M. 1395 (1953) (son). Contra, Liberty Sportswear Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 1236, 74
L.R.R.M. 1459 (1970) (sister).
238. NLRB v. Syracuse Stamping Co., 208 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1953); Tennessee Packers,
Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 165, 55 L.R.R.M. 1279 (1964), enforced, 344 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1965).
239. NLRB v. Lamar Creamery Co., 246 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1957).
240. NLRB v. Kinner Motors, Inc., 152 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1945); Manila Mfg. Co., 171
N.L.R.B. 1259, 68 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1968); Esgro, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 285, 49 L.R.R.M. 1472
(1962); Alamo Express, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 6, 40 L.R.R.M. 1438 (1957).
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sition on worklist,"' withholding severance pay"4 ' or a "certificate of last
employment, 2 4 3 refusal to restore reduced wages,2 4 4 issuing warnings or
reprimands,245 demotions," 46 reductions in seniority, 4 7 and other forms of
adverse action."s Even tacit approval by the employer of the ostracism

and ejection from the plant of a Board witness has been held sufficient to
subject the employer to section 8(a)(4) liability. 4"

(3) No demand can be made that charges be withdrawn as a precondition to favorable employer action toward the employee. This applies both
2 50
to actual reprisals for failure to withdraw the charges
and to promises
2 51
withdrawals.
such
upon
of benefits conditioned
(4) Conduct interfering or tending to interfere with Board hearings in

any way is proscribed. Hence, discharges for unexcused absences or for
similar dereliction of duties are carefully scrutinized when a Board proceeding is involved.
In Standard Packing Corp.,'53 the Board saw no
retaliatory animus in an employer's refusal to release employees to attend

241. NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961).
242. NLRB v. Darling & Co., 420 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1970).
243. Insulation Mfg. Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1440, 46 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1960).
244. Nelson Mfg. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 101, 66 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1967), enforced, 408 F.2d 685
(6th Cir. 1969).
245. NLRB v. Lifetime Door Co., 390 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1968); Gateway Transp. Co., 190
N.L.R.B. 199, 77 L.R.R.M. 1136 (1971); Kendall Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 805, 76 L.R.R.M. 1605
(1971).
246. American Rolbac Corp., 49 N.L.R.B. 516, 12 L.R.R.M. 169 (1943), enforced, 141
F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1944); Maxam Dayton, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 396, 53 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1963);
Beiser Aviation Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 399, 49 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1962).
247. Reliance Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 946, 16 L.R.R.M. 13 (1945); Contra, HamlinOverton Frame Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 84, 75 L.R.R.M., 1176 (1970).
248. NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co., 140 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1944); Springfield Garment Mfg.
Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1126, 59 L.R.R.M. 1646 (1965) (harassment). See also S.P. Growers Ass'n
v. Rodriquez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1976) (illegal to evict migrant
workers from company housing in reaction to suit filed by them against the company).
249. NLRB v. Fred P. Weissman Co., 170 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1948).
250. Shipwrecking, Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 1518, 50 L.R.R.M. 1028 (1962); Brunswick-BalkeCollender Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 574, 49 L.R.R.M. 1531 (1962), enforced sub nom. NLRB v.
Local 65, United Bhd of Carpenters, 318 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1963); Injection Moulding Co.,
104 N.L.R.B. 639, 32 L.R.R.M. 1087 (1953).
251. State Mechanical Constructors, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 547, 78 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1970);
Evening News Ass'n, 185 N.L.R.B. 430, 76 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1970). But see NLRB v. Selwyn
Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970) (supervisor's implication of possible rehire if
charges dropped not passed on to charging party, thus not violative of section 8(a)(4).
252. Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. English Mica
Co., 195 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1952); Block-Southland Sportswear, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 936, 67
L.R.R.M. 1566 (1968), enforced per curiam sub nom. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Great Lakes Screw Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 149, 65
L.R.R.M. 1236 (1967), enforcement denied on other grounds, 409 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1969).
253. 140 N.L.R.B. 628, 52 L.R.R.M. 1088 (1963).
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an NLRB hearing when they had not been subpoenaed and when it was
not shown that the employees' testimony was needed,'" but this decision
is not representative of recent trends. The Board's present attitude is reflected in Western Clinical Laboratory, Inc.,25" which concludes that an
employer's insistence that employees used accrued vacation time, rather
than leave without pay, for purposes of attendance at a Board hearing
violated the Act even though there was "no hint" of a discriminatory motive. The Board reasoned:
In order for the Board to fulfill its obligation to adequately administer
the Act, it is necessary that its processes not be unjustifiably fettered by
anything that precludes parties from participating in such processes free
from coercion or restraint .... In our judgment, potential witnesses will

be reluctant to take the time to testify at Board hearings if they fear the
loss of their accrued vacation time by doing so. Thus, the mere existence
of such an apprehension would have an adverse effect upon the Board's
ability to conduct fair and complete proceedings.2 "
Similarly, the current view is that there is no 7distinction between subpoenaed testimony and that given voluntarily."1
(5) Under several older decisions, it has not been found to be unlawful
to discharge an employee for prior misconduct which is revealed in his
testimony at a Board hearing,'" nor is it a section 8(a)(4) retaliation to
discharge an employee who reveals testimony given by the employer to
the NLRB. 5' But the employer's belief that the charges or testimony in
question are false or malicious may not justify discharge, whether or not
such belief is substantiated by facts.2"
(6) Neither lack of NLRB jurisdiction over the employer' 6" nor acqui254. See also NLRB v. Superior Co., 199 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1952); Astronautics Corp., 164
N.L.R.B. 623, 65 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1967); Vita Foods, 135 N.L.R.B. 1357, 49 L.R.R.M. 1723
(1962), enforced, 328 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1964).
255. 225 N.L.R.B. 725, 93 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1976).
256. Id. at 726, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1293.
257. NLRB v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 180 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1950).
258. NLRB v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 169 F.2d 169 (10th Cir. 1948); Richmond Home
Tel. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 452, 18 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1946).
259. Stocker Mfg. Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 666, 24 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1949).
260. The Kramer Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 921 (1941); But see, NLRB v. Brake Parts Co., 447
F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1971) (charges filed in bad faith and testimony knowingly false); Accord,
Dubin-Haskell Lining Corp. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1967), enforced in full rehearing, 386 F.2d 306 (1967), NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 333 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1964), and
Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964). See also Skaggs Pay Less
Drug Stores, 189 N.L.R.B. 249, 76 L.R.R.M. 1668 (1971) (calling officer of employer a "liar"
during hearing recess not shielded by section 8(a)(4)).
261. Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 447, 60 L.R.R.M. 1331 (1965).
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escence to union demands e2 serve as a defense to conduct otherwise violative of section 8(a)(4). In fact, although the Act is not as explicit in its
ban on union discrimination for participation in NLRB proceedings, it
has been held that such conduct is prohibited by both sections
8(b)(1)(A) 2s5 and 8(b)(2)2 4 of the Act.265
VIII.

"PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY"

As mentioned above in the context of safety complaints,ss section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7] of this title."2 6 7 Of the
section 7 rightss es protected by section 8(a)(1), the one pertinent to this
discussion is "to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Inclusion of the
phrase "for the purpose of collective bargaining" does not restrict the application of the Act to unionized employers or to those who are subjected
262.
263.

NLRB v. American White Cross Laboratories, 160 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1947).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) provides:'

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.
See Steelworkers Local 8061, 226 N.L.R.B. 403, 93 L.R.R.M. 1287 (1976).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied
or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
265. NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 279 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 228 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1955); Mountain Pacific Chapter, Associated
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 41 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1957), enforced, 306 F.2d 34
(9th Cir. 1962). The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("Landrum-Griflin")
protects union members who exercise their rights to make charges concerning the management of the union without reprisal by the union. See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v.
Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers &
Photoengravers Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1973); Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail
Clerks Intl Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969). See 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1976).
266. See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.
267. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
268. Section 7 of the Wagner Act is codified as 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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2
to organizational campaigns by recognized labor organizations. es
In a leading Supreme Court case, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co.,2 7 0 for example, seven employees were discharged for leaving their
work without permission. The employees took the position that their
workplace was too cold. Although the Board found the walkout to be pro'
the Fourth Circuit denied enforcement"' since
tected under Section 7, 71
the employees did not attempt to discuss the problem with their employer prior to walking out. Neither the lack of a union nor the "selfhelp" nature of the employees' conduct affected the statutory protection,
said the Supreme Court:

We cannot agree that employees necessarily lose their right to engage in
concerted activities under § 7 merely because they do not present a specific demand upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objecHaving no bargaining representative and no established
tionable ....
procedure by which they could take full advantage of their unanimity of
opinion in negotiations with the company, the men took the most direct
course to let the company know that they wanted a warmer place in
which to work s
Nor was the existence of a plant rule forbidding an employee from leaving
work without permission sufficient to justify the discharges as "for
cause". "Section 10(c) of the Act does authorize an employer to discharge
employees for 'cause'. . . . But this, of course, cannot mean that an employer is at liberty to punish a man by discharging him for engaging in
concerted activities which § 7 of the Act protects.' 7 4
Nonetheless, the Court warned, not all concerted activities are protected by section 7. The Court pointed specifically to prior decisions in
which the Court had held unlawful'1 or violent27 e conduct to be unprotected. Also enumerated as unprotected were actions taken which constituted a breach of contract, 77 or which were "indefensible" because of a
269. Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963)
(letter complaining about sanitary conditions); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v.
NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953) (petition seeking back wages under Fair Labor Standards Act); Columbia University, 236 N.L.R.B. 793, 98 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1978) (seeking to
serve as a witness at a fellow employee's discharge interview).
270. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
271. 126 N.L.R.B. 1410, 45 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1960).
272. 291 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961).
273. 370 U.S. at 14-15.
274. 370 U.S. at 16-17.
275. Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (mutiny in violation of federal

law).
276. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sitdown strike deemed
an act of trespass).
277. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (strike in breach of no-strike clause).
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demonstration of a degree of "disloyalty" to the employer unnecessary to
the carrying out of otherwise legitimate concerted activities. 76
In the definitive treatise on federal labor law,279 the Court's list of unprotected activities is expanded by other examples,280 including: "serious
trespass, destruction of property and violence, '

281

"mutiny aboard ship in

statute,"" 2

violation of a federal criminal
strikes in violation of a collective bargaining agreement, 8 3 strikes in derogation of a recognized labor
organization's authority,1 " strikes to compel a violation of the law,2 85 and
partial, intermittent or "quickie" strikes." Additionally, federal courts of
appeals have recognized that employee protests which are inappropriate
to the situation lose their statutory protection,28 7 a position rarely accepted by the NLRB. 2"
An example in contrasting the attitude of the Board with that of the
courts is found in NLRB v. Wilson Freight Co. 2 8 Smith, the charging
party, was a Teamsters shop steward who wrote a letter to the Governor
of Massachusetts complaining about inadequate heat in his employer's
truck terminal, claiming that the company was in violation of a state regulation. Smith's letter came on the heels of a state-wide agreement, ap278. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) (distributing handbills accusing
the employer, a television station, of treating the city as "second class" in providing a poor
quality of programming). See also Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 188 (9th Cir.
1956); Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951).
279. C. Moius, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (1971) (Supps. 1971-1975, 1977, 1978).
280. Id. at 124-127.
281. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB v. Clearfield
Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1954); Berkshire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 134 (3d
Cir. 1943); Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 680 (1940); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939).
282. 316 U.S. at 47.
283. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co.,
306 U.S. 332 (1939); United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Joseph
Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445, 19 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1947); Scullin Steel Co., 65
N.L.R.B. 1294, 17 L.R.R.M. 218 (1946).
284. NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963); Gould, The Status of
Unauthorized and 'Wildcat' Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CoRmEL
L.Q. 672 (1967).
285. Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149
F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945); Thompson Products, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 886, 19 L.R.R.M. 1221
(1947).
286. NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); C.G. Conn, Ltd. v.
NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939) (refusal to work overtime); Valley City Furniture Co.,
110 N.L.R.B. 1589, 35 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1954), enforced, 230 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1956).
287. NLRB v. Jamestown Veneer & Plywood Corp., 194 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1952).
288. Terry Poultry Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1097,35 L.R.R.M. 1516 (1954); Elk Lumber Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 333, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1950).
289. 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Wilson Freight Co., 100
S. Ct. 1650 (1980).
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proved by the Commonwealth, between a truck owners' association and
the Teamsters, setting forth how the truck owners would comply with the
state's heat regulation. The letter claimed that the agreement was illegal
and improper, whereupon the Governor responded that the plan negotiated between the Teamsters and the truck owners was legally sufficient.
In March, 1975, Smith wrote to the new Governor of Massachusetts and
again complained about the heat, referring to the head of the Massachusetts Division of Industrial Safety as "full of bull." 90
This led to an exchange of letters between the truck owners, the union,
and the state, in which the question was raised as to why Smith had not
filed a grievance. Smith wrote a second letter to the Governor claiming
that he had filed a grievance, but this claim proved untrue. The company
wrote Smith a letter criticizing his actions. Smith followed with numerous
other complaints to the employer under his signature as shop steward but
without approval of the union.
In April, 1975, Smith received a written warning for violating ICC regulations. He also complained to OSHA about the company's failure to provide personal protective clothing for drivers in the event of chemical or
acid spills. This led to an OSHA inspection in which the company was
cited. Soon thereafter, Smith violated company rules by carrying an unauthorized passenger and was discharged. Smith filed an unfair labor
practice charge and a grievance over the discharge went to arbitration. He
was reinstated by the arbitrator and the unfair labor practice charge was
withdrawn.
After his reinstatement, Smith began to complain about the company's
failure to comply with Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations.
He personally led a campaign to compel DOT officials to take action
against the company. Smith wrote congressmen to enlist their support.
Smith complained to DOT about the lack of snow chains in the middle of
the summer and also complained to the NLRB over its dismissal of a
charge filed by a co-worker. He continued to protest the NLRB's dismissal of the charge even though it was a result of a settlement between the
company and the union. Smith received a warning for his continuous
complaint over this matter. On two occasions in the fall of 1976, he wrote
"void" on bid sheets posted by the company which resulted in employees
not filling out the bid sheets; on the second such occasion, Smith was
discharged.
The Board found each of Smith's complaints to be protected activity
and found that his discharge violated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (4) of the
Act." 11 The First Circuit denied enforcement, holding that Smith's duties
290.
291.

604 F.2d at 715.
234 N.L.R.B. 844, 97 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1978).
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as a shop steward were limited and his actions had exceeded that limitation. The fact that he acted in his capacity of shop steward, rather than
as an individual employee, rendered Smith's action unprotected by section 8(a)(1). As to the section 8(a)(4) finding, the court again found that
Smith's actions were in excess of the limitations placed on shop stewards
under the collective bargaining agreement and, consequently, were
unprotected.
As one often quoted commentator" has analyzed section 8(a)(1), there
are four elements: (1) a work-related complaint or grievance, (2) furtherance of some group interest, (3) direction of the concerted activity toward
a specific remedy or result, and (4) absence of unlawful or improper conduct or objectives .2" Although the Board's policy tends to accept the
charging party's version of the facts while branding employer justifications as pretextual, a survey of the decisions of the reviewing courts during the past two years displays their strong adherence to these standards.
An individual complaint about the condition of the employer's parking
lot is not protected, s" but it is unlawful to discharge employees who issue
a press release concerning a lawsuit filed against their employer."95 The
Board has found that even in the absence of prior complaints or accidents, an employee who gives a safety-related excuse for refusing to unlatch a truck door at a loading dock was engaged in protected activity.'"
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit refused to find "implied concerted
action" in a single employee's filing of a complaint concerning carbon
monoxide poisoning." 7 Walking off the job to protest an undesirable work
assignment is protected where the assignment is a "group concern."'" An
individual employee's picketing of a unionized facility is unprotected if
there has been no grievance filed and no prior support of the employee's
complaint by his co-workers or his union'"
The First Circuit"s refused to enforce a Board order of reinstatement"" for twenty-one employees who staged a "sick-out" in protest of
the firing of a high-level manager, since the manager was not closely connected with employees' day-to-day working conditions and the means of
protest was "unreasonable." But virtually any formal or informal com292. T. Kheel, Labor Law in 18A BuSIaSS ORGANIZATIONS (1979).
293. Id. at 9A-36.
294. Capitol Ornamental Concrete Specialties, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 103 L.R.R.M.
1518 (Mar. 31, 1980).
295. Automobile Club v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1979).
296. United Parcel Serv., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 103 L.R.R.M. 1233 (Feb. 5, 1980).
297. NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980).
298. Ontario Knife, 247 N.L.P.B. No. 168, 103 L.R.R.M. 1309 (Feb. 21, 1980).
299. Anco Insulations, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 103 L.R.R.M. 1198 (Jan. 28, 1980).
300. Abilities & Goodwill, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1979).
301. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 100 L.R.R.M. 1470 (Mar. 15, 1979).
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plaint is protected, no matter with whom the complaint is aired. Workmen's compensation claims,8 0 2 unemployment compensation claims, "0

protests over the firing of a "sympathetic supervisor,"'3'0 EEOC
charges, 05 supporting fellow employees before a state antidiscrimination
agency,s3" lobbying or testimony before legislative or rule-making bodies,30 and OSHA complaints' 8 are all within the ambit of section 7
rights.
The Board is left, as the Supreme Court put it in Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB,' 09 with the task "to delineate precisely the boundaries of the 'mutual aid and protection' clause,"' 1 0 since the Court declined to specify the
point at which the relationship of concerted activity to group interests
"becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come
within" that clause. 11 The apparent irrationality of some of the Board's
decisions in this area has produced a flurry of criticisms from the courts
of appeals, but the Board remains adamant that it is "setting national
labor policy" and cannot be hindered by the opinions of the appellate
courts.' 1 ' This attitude on the Board's part appears unlikely to change,
and results in comments such as those by Judge Aldrich quoted at the
302.

Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Corp, 245 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 102 L.R.R.M. 1492 (Sept. 28,

1979), enforcement denied,

-

F.2d

-

(4th Cir. 1980).

303. Supreme Optical Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1432, 98 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1978).
304. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 885, 49 L.R.R.M. 1594 (1962), rejected by a series
of court decisions: Magna Visual v. NLRB, 516 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1975); American Art Clay
Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1964); Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th
Cir. 1963).
305. Schneider's Dairy, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 104 L.R.R.M. 1021 (April 10, 1980);
United States Postal Serv., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 102 L.R.R.M. 1522 (Sept. 28, 1979).
306. Massachusetts Women's Hosp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1289, 95 L.R.R.M. 1616 (1977).
307. Kaienr Engineers v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1976); Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1940). Cf. Richboro Community Mental Health Council,
Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 174, 101 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1979) (letters to government funding
agencies).
308. See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text.
309. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
310. 437 U.S. at 568.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., comments attributed to NLRB Chairman John Fanning in an interview
with Legal Times of Washington Aug. 18, 1980, at 6: "Courts that try to browbeat us...
are just not recognizing that we are trying to administer a national law." (Deletion in
original).
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beginning of this article. 18
IX.

A.

IISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS OF THE RETALIATION CONCEPT

Other Federal Statutes

The 1866 Civil Rights Act, 1 4 currently in vogue as an ancillary jurisdictional basis for Title VII race discrimination suits, has been generally
interpreted as providing no remedy for retaliatory conduct. 1 6 But the
same approach has not been employed in actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,1' due to the First Amendment free-speech implications inherent
in many such cases.8 17 There is no federally-protected right to prevent
discrimination against those who testify, as was pointed out in Carter v.
s18
Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
In this case two white male applicants were rejected by the railroad. In
suing the company, they argued that each had been rejected due to testi313. See supra note 1.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
315. Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1977,
1978); Sutton v. Timken Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1338 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Hudson v.
IBM, Inc., 9 EmpL Prac. Dec. 7133 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Tramble v. Converters Ink Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1350, 1354 (N.D. M. 1972). Compare with Terrell v. Feldstein Co., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6800 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 468 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1972). See Young v. ITT, 438
F.2d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 1971). But in three cases-Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266
(6th Cir. 1977); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian Medical Center, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 165
(N.D. Ill. 1978), supplemented, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 177 (1980); Strozier v. General
Motors Corp., 442 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ga. 1977)-dismissal of section 1981 reprisal claims at
the pleadings stage was denied.
316. The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usuage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
317. Waters v. Peterson, 495 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cole v. Choctaw County Bd. of
Educ., 471 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1973); Sherwood v. Farrar, 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7905 (W.D.
Mich. 1975); O'Brien v. Shimp, 365 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. M11.
1973); Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 329 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Miss. 1971), afl'd, 462 F.2d 1112 (5th
Cir. 1972). Cf., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (retaliatory eviction for
reporting housing code violations).
318. 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
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mony that they had given against the railroad in tort cases. They contended that Georgia law gave them a right to testify,31 9 and that another

Georgia statute provided, "there is no right without a remedy.

' 320

The

court was not impressed with these arguments. In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Judge Alaimo first found that the

action was barred by the statute of limitations, but then proceeded to
observe:
However, even if the claims are not time barred, plaintiffs have failed to
state an actionable claim because under Georgia law no right to employment exists in the absence of an enforceable contract created by the mutual assent of the parties. In sum, an employer may, under state law,
n
.
refuse to employ another for any reason or for no reason at all.
Even so, remedies for retaliation can be sought under a wide variety of

federal statutes, including the Federal

Employers'

Liability Act

(FELA),8 2 2 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

(ERISA),82 the Longshoremen and Harborworkers' Compensation Act,au

and the Civil Service Reform Act."' State statutes often provide additional remedies 2 6 which may, under appropriate circumstances, be asserted as claims pendent to a federal action.3 27 An imaginative plaintiffs'
attorney can, with this potpourri of remedial and jurisdictional statutes,
shop for the best or throw in as many as his inventiveness will permit.
B.

"Informer's Privilege"
Although extended discussion of the topic is beyond the scope of this

319. GA. CODE ANN. § 79-205 (1933);
2-104 (1977).
320. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-105 (1933).

See also GA.

CONST. art. I,

§ 1,

4, GA. CODE ANN. §

321. 392 F. Supp. at 499. But see Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir.
1980).
322. 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1970). See Hendley v. Central R.R., 442 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ga.
1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1980).
323. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1970). See Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534
(E.D. Wis. 1980).
324. 33 U.S.C. § 948a (1970).
325. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301(b)(9), 2302(b)(8)-(9), 2303 (West Supp. 1980).
326. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Annot., 63
A.L.R.3d 979 (1975) (retaliation against workmen's compensation claimants); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-6.1, 1-55 (1979) (same). Contra, Blevins v. General Elec. Co., 491 F. Supp. 521,
525 (W.D. Va. 1980). See generally Survey, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of
South CarolinaLaw, 32 S.C.L. REv. 221 (1980). See also, 2 LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.36 (Desk ed. 1980).
327. E.g., Richardson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 387 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); But see,
Pandis v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 431 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Conn.
1977).
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article, protection against retaliation is the rationale upon which the socalled "informer's privilege" is based. As the Fifth Circuit explained in
Wirtz v. Continental Finance & Loan Co.,382
The Government's qualified privilege not to disclose the names of informers is well recognized in criminal cases, e.g., Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938); see, e.g., Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 214, 221 (1957) .... In this case the Secretary asserts that there is
a vital public interest in preserving the anonymity of employees who
complain to the Government that their employer is paying substandard
wages. The Government would have a virtually impossible task if it had
to rely on its own policing activities to discover all violations of the Wage
and Hour laws; it must therefore depend largely upon the employees
themselves, who of course know exactly what they are being paid and
what their services are for what they are paid. These employees, however, are particularly susceptible to the fear of retaliation, and to obtain
the necessary cooperation, they must be reasonably assured that the
names of informers will not be divulged319
Professor McCormick agrees: "Informers are shy and timorous folk, and if
their names were subject to be readily revealed, this source of information
would be almost cut off.'' o
In the labor relations context, this fear is more imagined than real.
With the panoply of statutory protections otherwise afforded, it is difficult to explain the need for an informer's privilege to protect those who
assist in Labor Department, EEOC or NLRB investigations. Moreover,
the identity of the informant should be disclosed where there are grounds
to believe that the information so provided is false or malicious.
The extreme solicitude accorded to those who assist in investigations is
manifested by the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the term "informer privilege" as a "reference which we do not favor. The persons to be protected
They are
by the privilege are employees with legitimate complaints ....
not... paid undercover agents." ' A more objective view is that taken
by Wright and Miller: "What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the government's privilege to withhold from disclosure
the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with enforcement of that law. '8 32 Apparently, the privi328. 326 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1964).

329. Id. at 563.
330. C.T. MCCORMICK,
331.

case).
332.

EVIDENCE § 11 (2d ed. 1972).

Brennan v. Engineered Prod., Inc., 506 F.2d 299, 300 (8th Cir. 1974) (Equal Pay Act

C. WRIGHT & A. Mmum, FxvmrnL PIAcrncz & PRocEDuRE § 2019 (1970) (emphasis
supplied), quoted with approval in, Hodgson v. Mihaljevic, 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6760 (N.D.
Ind. 1974) (Equal Pay Act); But see Brennan v. Glens Falls Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 8 Empl.
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lege is utilized as a method of bringing judicial scrutiny to bear upon the
employer before, rather than after, the identity of the complaining or cooperating parties is known, on the theory that "an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure." Beyond the prophylactic aspects of the privilege,
the underlying rationale is that of encouraging the free flow of information to the Government investigator. s w
X.

TURNING THE

TABLES:

EMPLOYER REMEDIES FOR VEXATIOUS,

MALICIOUS OR ToRTous CONDUCT

OF EMPLOYEES

Let us assume, for the moment, that an employer who has been subjected to the charges and complaints of a vindictive individual is somehow able to prevail in court or before the various administrative agencies
created to safeguard individual rights from retaliation. What, then, may
he do? The prospect of having only the warm feeling of having
"won"-defended at every step by attorneys whose fees are being paid by
the employer irrespective of the outcome-represents at best a hollow
victory. Little wonder, then, that the employer typically wants to "get

even."
The most common avenue selected for the venting of this pent-up emotion is direct action against the complainant, but the foregoing discussion
has illustrated the innumerable hurdles placed by Congress to this
straightforward resolution of the employer's need for catharsis. Since the
direct course is unavailing, the employer then turns to his attorney once
more and asks for an alternative course of action. There are essentially
two possible approaches which may be followed: either recoupment of the
employer's expenditures in attorneys' fees and costs, or a damage action
against the "squeaky wheel." Each course has inherent advantages and
disadvantages. Neither, in the normal case, can survive a cost-benefit
analysis.
A.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs-No Two-Way Street
Not long after publication of pleas for even-handed assessment of

attorneys' fees against plaintiffs in discrimination suits, 8 4 the Supreme
Prac. Dec. 6493 (N.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Wright & Miller but opining that the purpose of the
privilege is "to avoid possible retaliation by the employer.")
333. See Usery v. Vermont Food Indus., Inc., 81 Lab. Cas. 47,810 (D. Vt. 1977). Cf.,
Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972) (delay in giving notice of charge to
employer justified "in accordance with [EEOC's] policy minimizing reprisals against complaints.") See also Stephenson Enterprises, Inc. v. Marshall, 578 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir.
1978).
334. Edwards, Labor Relations and Attorneys' Fees, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 1161 (1976); Heinsz,
Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable Standard, 8 U.
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Court laid down a new rule in such cases:
[A] district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case [only] upon a finding that the plaintiff's
action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation ... or that the
plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. And, needless to
say, if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a claim in
bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with the
attorney's fees incurred by the defense. "
Few courts have been willing to vault this barrier and tax attorneys' fees
against a losing plaintiff, especially when the plaintiff is a private individual. Carrion v. Yeshiva University,8 es discussed above, 8 7 was quoted by
8s' and remains the best
the Court with approval in Christiansburg
illustration of an instance of frivolous litigation in which fees were charged
against the plaintiff. One court invited a fee application 8 9 against a plaintiff who had threatened to kill various company officers and was discharged for insubordination.
Another interesting recent decision is Obin v. Machinists, District No.
9." 0 The decision on the merits of this case came after a five-day trial in
which the jury returned a verdict for defendants, the Machinists Union
and Anheuser Busch, on all counts. The court awarded both parties all
costs, awarded Anheuser Busch $25,000.00 in attorney's fees and awarded
the union $19,395.00 in attorney's fees.
Obin had been discharged by Anheuser Busch in 1975. His ten-year
employment record showed twenty incidents of misconduct including violation of work rules, refusal to work, absenteeism, leaving work early,
sleeping on the job, insubordination and assault. The disciplinary action
included reprimands, suspensions and the ultimate discharge. The discharge was the result of plaintiff's cursing, berating and spraying beer on
another employee who had reported plaintiff for drinking on the job.
Plaintiff, informed that disciplinary action would be taken against him,
denied the entire incident with the employee; it was not until the third
step of the grievance procedure that the union found out he had been
ToLzno L. Rxv. 259 (1977).
335. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
336. 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976).
337. Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
338. 434 U.S. at 421.
339. Jeremiah v. United Technologies Corp., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 152, 154 (D. Conn.
1980). See also Harris v. Plastic Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1980), citing EEOC v. First
Ala. Bank, 595 F.2d 1050, 1056 (5th Cir. 1979); Woods v. New York, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec.
16,914 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
340. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 815 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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lying. Accordingly, no arbitration was requested and the discharge
remained final.
The evidence from the trial established that plaintiff had received eight
corrective letters during his employment, had been counselled on numerous occasions by both management and union representatives, and had a
total of nine weeks and four days of disciplinary suspension. Company
and union officials testified that plaintiff had the worse record of any machinist employed at Anheuser Busch; his allegations of religious discrimination were not supported by any any substantial evidence. During the
pendency of the action, both defendants repeatedly told plaintiff that the
action was frivolous and instituted in bad faith. Nevertheless, plaintiff
continued to vigorously prosecute his claims. The court found the amount
of attorney's fees requested by the defendants to be reasonable in light of
the fact that a vigorous defense was required for over two and one-half
years in a specialized area of labor law and that plaintiff had a net worth
of $200,000. The amount, therefore, did not place an unjust burden on
the plaintiff.
In Fisher v. Fashion Institute,"' the employer and union were also
awarded attorney's fees against plaintiff. In finding that defendants were
entitled to attorney's fees, the court found plaintiff's claim of race and
sex discrimination to be frivolous and meritless, lacking in any factual
basis, presented in the face of overwhelming factual evidence demonstrating no discrimination, and obviously vindictive. The court also found the
plaintiff's testimony to be incredible, evasive and untrustworthy:
These improper motivations became increasingly apparent during the
course of the trial from, among other things, the overwhelming documentary and credible testimonial evidence against plaintiff; proof that defendants FIT and Marcus had favored plaintiff in the past; the willingness
of the chairpersons to give plaintiff a one-year trial period, instead of
filling the job she sought with another applicant; the evasiveness and untrustworthiness of plaintiff's testimony concerning almost every important aspect of the case; the fact that plaintiff claims to have realized FIT
engaged in racial discrimination only after she was denied a second promotion; the fact that she claimed racial discrimination against the union
and its Grievance Community without any supporting evidence, simply
because they refused to press her grievance; and the fact that she went so
far as to attack Helen Randolph, a black with clearly superior credentials, suggesting that Ms. Randolph had supported FIT because she had
gotten the job plaintiff sought. M
The court further found that some of the fees incurred by defendants
341.
342.

22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 1170-71.
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were caused by actions of plaintiff's counsel, who entered into stipulations without plaintiff's approval. The plaintiff refused to enter into the
stipulations. Much of the subpoenaed material was clearly irrelevant and
those aspects of the subpoena were suppressed by the court, but the court
ordered production of some arguably relevant material with a warning to
counsel that his lack of care and planning of the case might result in his
being charged with excess costs under 28 U.S.C. § 19 27 ." s The court expressed doubts as to whether plaintiff's counsel even read the documents
that were ultimately produced, inasmuch as the documents clearly supported the defendant's position in every respect. Yet, plaintiff's proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law did not refer to the documents.
Finally, the court found that it was safe to infer that plaintiff's counsel
knew that plaintiff's claim lacked merit. Accordingly, defendants were invited to seek recovery of excess costs and attorney's fees from plaintiff's
counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
This latter invitation may have been withdrawn by the Supreme
Court's later decision in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper," which held
that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 cannot be used to assess attorney's fees against
plaintiff's counsel although excess costs could properly be imposed upon
counsel under the statute. Nonetheless, the Court continued,
The power of a court over members of its bar is at least as great as its
authority over litigants. If a court may tax counsel fees against a party
who has litigated in bad faith, it certainly may assess
those expenses
"
against counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes. 5
The burden of satisfying the Christiansburgstandards, or the even more
restrictive Pipercriterion, is not likely to be satisfied in any but the most
aggravated of cases. This leaves the employer with only one other
choice-to sue.
B.

The Employer Suit
With the Supreme Court's decison in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, " s

343. The statute reads:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976).
344. 100 S. Ct. 2455 (1980).
345. 100 S. Ct. at 2464.
346. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1965), noted in, inter
alia, 44 T x. L. Rzv. 1400 (1966); 20 Sw. L.J. 884 (1966); 16 Drake L. Rov. 106 (1967); 45
N.C.L. Rev. 274 (1966); 45 Or. L. Rev. 144 (1966); 20 ARK. L. REv. 195 (1966); 33 TENN. L.
REv. 400 (1966); 9 S. Tax. L.J. 94 (1967); 189 Publishers' Weekly 40 (1966); 38 U. COLO. L.
REv. 619 (1966); 17 SvYAcusz L. Rv. 766 (1966); 31 Mo. L. REv. 453 (1966); and 51 MARQ.
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a new aspect was added to the reprisal picture. Linn, an assistant general
manager of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, sued the union, two
of its officers and a Pinkerton's employee for circulating "false, malicious,
clearly libelous and damaging""' leaflets in the course of an election campaign directed against Pinkerton's in Detroit. The trial court dismissed
the complaint, holding that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction since
the alleged conduct, if proved, "would arguably constitute an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(b)."" The Sixth Circuit affirmed."
Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the five-justice majority, reviewed a
number of NLRB decisions 8s to conclude that when a person utters or
publishes statements "with actual malice, 'a deliberate intention to falsify' or a 'malevolent desire to injure,'" that person "forfeits his protection under the Act." 5 1 The Court noted that employees had been permitted to sue their employers for malicious interference with a lawful
occupation, 83 and analogized the considerations to be made by the Court
to those employed in New York Times v. Sullivan:s 5s "We therefore limit
the availability of state remedies for libel to those instances in which the
complainant can show that the defamatory statements were circulated
with malice and caused him damage." 8 "
Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion was caustic.
The Court holds that an individual participant on the employer's side of
a labor dispute can sue the union for libel on account of charges made by
the union in the heat of the dispute. By the same token, I assume that
under the Court's holding, individual labor union members now have the
right to sue their employers when they say naughty things during labor
disputes. This new Court-made law tosses a monkey wrench into the collective machinery Congress set up to try to settle labor disputes, and at
the same time exalts the law of libel to an even higher level of importance in the regulation of day-to-day life in this country. 55
Recognizing that "almost all people" know "that in labor disputes both
L. Ria. 89 (1967).
347. 383 U.S. at 55.
348. Unreported opinion, quoted in 383 U.S. at 55. The District Court relied on the
preemption doctrine set forth in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959).
349. 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
350. Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950); Walls Mfg. Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1317, 50 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1962); Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 21 L.R.R.M.
1222 (1948); Atlantic Towing Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1169, 21 L.R.R.M. 1128 (1948).
351. 383 U.S. at 61.
352. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
353. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
354. 383 U.S. at 64-65.
355. 383 U.S. at 67.
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sides are masters of the arts of vilification, invective and exaggeration,"
Justice Black argued that "Congress intended no purpose to try to purify
the language of labor disputes or force the disputants to say nice things
about one another.""
It is only a short step from the election campaign in Linn to administrative enforcement proceedings. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 57 the cause of action discussed in
Linn may have application to malicious statements made in a charge or
in the course of investigation. Thus far, the doctrine has been sparingly
applied,'" with some justifications. It is submitted that the character of
356. 383 U.S. at 67-68.
357. 411 F.2d 998, 1007 n.22 (5th Cir. 1969).
358. See, e.g., Local 496, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 192 S.E.2d 737 (1972),
reversed, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), noted in, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 560 (1975), and Browne & Sachs,
The End of Libel in Labor Cases?, 62 A.B.A.J. 456 (1976). In Bartulica v. Paculdo, 411 F.
Supp. 392 (W.D. Mo. 1976), removal of a defamation action to federal court was denied, in
the face of the defendant's allegations that the suit had been brought in retaliation against
her opposition to unlawful employment practices inflicted upon her. Recent decisions permitting employer suits include Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979),
in which the court refused to condemn an employer's "malicious harassment" action against
any employee who had filed 43 separate unfair labor practice charges and several OSHA
complaints against various employers and unions. But see United Credit Bureau, Inc., 242
N.L.R.B. No. 138, 101 L.R.R.M. 1277 (June 8, 1979).
Ramifications of this type of suit in tort law are seen in Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 57
N.W.2d 915 (1953) (employee's suit for intentional infliction of mental distress against employer who threatened employee with discharge unless a suit against the employer were
dismissed), and Paducah Newspapers v. Wyse, 247 S.W.2d 989 (Ky. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 942 (1952) (defamatory to say that employer is "unfair to labor"). It is not defamatory
to state that an employer "refused to make concessions to" a union (Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. McGraw Hill Pub. Co., 146 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1944)), or that a person is a "labor
agitator" (Vallen v. Fanjo Taxi Corp., 73 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Wabash R.R. v.
Young, 162 Ind. 102, 69 N.E. 1003 (1904); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Medley, 55 OkI. 145, 155
P. 211 (1916)), or "left employment during a strike," (Kansas City, M. & B.R.R. v. Delaney,
102 Tenn. 289, 52 S.W. 151 (1899)).
In Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court
refused to grant plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim for abuse of federal
administrative and judicial process. The plaintiffs argued that their previous actions of having EEOC charges in a Title VII suit were protected by section 704(a). The court relied on
the line of cases, holding that the protection of section 704(a) does not extend to illegal
activity or activity that unreasonably interferes with the employer's legitimate interest, to
find that section 704(a) did not offer the plaintiffs the immunity they claimed. The court
distinguished the case of a counterclaim for malicious prosecution, which would be barred
because it would not be actionable until the determination of the main action, from the tort
of malicious abuse of process which may be pleaded at any time because it does not rest on
the course of a court proceeding. See Cooper v. Pic-Wash Freight Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6161 (E.D. Mo. 1976). Finally, in EEOC v. Virginia-Carolina Veneer Corp., 24 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 17,303 (W.D. Va. 1980), the court held that allegations made in an EEOC charge were
absolutely privileged and that state defamation actions filed by employers, based upon such
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the statements which would support a Linn suit would be far more appropriate as a defense or in mitigation of damages for reprisal than they
could be in a collateral proceeding for defamation, although the desire of
the aggrieved employer to "get even" will continue to be strong if the
agencies and courts refuse to inquire into the motives of those who institute or support enforcement proceedings.

XI. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing shows, there is little apparent reason for an employee
bent on damaging his employer to undergo the time-consuming administrative processes and litigation under Title VII, especially when such conduct could produce an attorney's fee award against him should the employer prevail. By far the least troublesome route for the employee is
through the NLRB, with its proclivity to find virtually all employee complaints to be protected and concerted. Only the most outrageous facts will
justify a Power Systems-type complaint or an attorney's fee award as in
Carrion.This is no remedy for the employer who feels he has been wrongfully charged and put to unnecessary expense, but the facts remain that
the cost of "getting even" is seldom worth the effort. Thus, while the
"squeaky wheel" may have been replaced rather than greased, the
chances of recovering the maintenance costs appear remote.

allegations, are subject to dismissal.

